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term dravya or padartha (substance)in Jainism denotesany existence which
possess the significant factor of persistence despite its numerous
qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave
room for both an absolute permenides and an eternal flux of Heraclitus.1
It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the three fundamental
characteristics, viz. Utpida (origin), vyava (destruction), and dhrauvya
is also the substratum of gunas (qualities) and paryayas (modes)3.
There is neither quality without substance nor subhstance without
quality.4 Dravya is one as a class, and is the inherent
essence of all things manifesting diverse forms,5 In its
reality it can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent
substantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in
character.6 Dravya is of six kinds, namely, Jiva (soul),
pudgala (matter), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of
rest), Akasa (space) and Kala (time) The first five types of dravyas are
called astikayas (those which exist and have different pradesas or areas
like a body) and the last is named anastikaya.7
to another classification it is of three kinds, viz. sakriya (active),
niskriya (inactive), and sakriyaaniskriya (active-inactive). The sakriya
dravyas, which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are
pudgala and jiva. The niskriya dravya is against the narture of sakriya
dravya. It has neither direct nor indirect functional power. Space comes
under this classification. Kala is also included in the category of
Niskriya dravyas, though it accounts for changes in other things.
Sakriya niskrla dravyas are those realities which move about without
themselves undergoing changes or motion. These have merely avagahana
(place). The dharma and adharma dravya come under this classification.
Jiva, dharma, and adharma have innumerable areas or pradesas,akasa has
infinite pradesas, and pudgala is of numerable pradesas. Kala has one
pradesa.9 These six dravyas maintain their identical nature
without losing their respective qualities, though they are nutually
interpenetrating and accommodate one another and mix up to occupy the
same space.9 Akasa, Kala, Jiva, dharma and adharma are
formless or amurta drvyas. They do not possess the sense qualities of
contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. Pudgala (matter) alone is murta.
All the dravyas, except Jiva, are acetana (devoid of consciousness).10
another classification, the dravyas or Tattvas are divided into seven
categories, viz. Jiva (soul), ajiva (nonsoul), asrava (inflow of karmic
matter into the sould), bandha (bondage of soul by karmic matter),
sanbara (stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter), nirjara (shedding of
karmic matter), and moksa (liberation of sould from karmic matter). The
seven tattvasare so arranged here as to provide an epitome of the Jaina
doctrine of salvation. The plight of the Jiva in somsara and mirjara are
two states in the process of liberation wherein the inflow of karmic
matter is first stopped and all karmic matter is subsequently shed. The
jivd thus becomes completely free of karmic matter and attains moksa.
These seven tattvas are eternal and `'sat".11
Jaina theory of soul, though fundamentally similar to the concept of
soul in othe philosophical schools, is still differrent from them in
certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. There is
no controversy on this point. The controversial point is its nature. The
Samhitas of the Rigveda12 and Atharvaveda13 state
about the nature of the soul that when a man dies, it goes to the world
of his forefathers and stays with ceaseless perfect life. The Sataptha
Brahmana14 points out that it is enjoyer of good or evil
deeds. The Upanisads are against its plural form15. According
to the Kathopanisad16, it is eternal and distinct from body.
Avidya is the cause of wandering into birth.17 Further,
Gaudapada says that it is one and neither born nor created. Maya
(illusion) is the casue of appearance of births. Ssnkara follows
Gaudapada's view, saying "It is due to maya, pure and simple, that
the Great Self (Atman) appears as the threefold states (viz. walking,
dreaming the dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the
the Sankhya and the Yoga systems are practically one.19
Sankhya presents the doctrfues while the Yoga prescribes certain
practices for the sake of their spiritual development'. The sould in
these philosophies is accepted in the form of purusa, but it is said to
be absolutely non-active or unattached to prakrti or matter and Purusa
is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the Prakrti20.
to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika philosophy, the soul itself is
responsible for its deeds. Its is eternal and possesses the non-eternal
qualities such as consciousness, desire etc. Jnana (knowledge) is
distinct from soul and it obtains the capacity of knowing by association
with itself. That means Juana is devoid of knowing power by nature21.
Buddha, on the other hand, declined to answer the nature of sould as he
felt that it is not indispensible for the removal of suffering. The
entire universe in his view is a bundle of Khandhaas, viz. rupa (body),
vedana (feeling) sanna (perception), sankhara (aggregates), and vinnana
(consciousness). All things including even soul are analysed into the
elements that can be perceived in them. All things are devoid of soul,
just as a chariot is nothing but a congregation of wheel, frame, etc.
"I" or "Mine" should not be attached with mundane
affaris if one wants to attain salvation. Hence this view is named
anatta in Buddism.22
considers soul as the central figure. Its perfect knowledge (Bhedajnana
or Atmajnana) is essential to destroy karmsa and attain salvation.23
The nature of soul in Jainism is to be understood from the standpoint of
non-absolutism (anekantavada). From the real standpoint (niscayanaya),
soul is absolutely pure possessing the nature of knowledge and vision (ahameko
khalu siddho damsanamiya sadrupi)24. It is regarded to be
without smell, without sound, not an object of anumand (inference),
without any definite bodily shape, imperceptible and intangible and is
characterised by consciousness25. Acarya Nemicandra points
out that the soul is characterised by upayoga (consciousness), is
formless (amutti), is an agent (katta), has the same extent as its own
body (sadehaparimana), is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (bhotta),
exists in world (samsarattho), is siddha (siddho) and has the
characteristic upward motion (vissasoddhagai):
ubao gamao amutti katta sadehaparimano.
samsarattho siddho so vissasoddhagai26
we have seen that the nature of soul in Jainism is dual in character.
According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same unhder all
states, while accroding to the practical standpoint, it is transformed
into modes and thus becomes different in number, place, form, etc.
perceived or enjoyed by the senses, bodies, mind, karma, and the other
material objects are called Pudgala (matter)27. They can be
touched tasted, smelt, and have colour. Sabda (sound produced by various
means). Bandha (union caused by man or otherwise), sauksmya (fineness),
shaulya (grossness) samsthana (figure), bheda (dividion), tamas
(darkness), chaya (shade) and atapa (sun-shine) are the forms of Pudgala.
it has two prominent forms, namely atoms (anu) and molecule (skandhas)28.
They unite together to construct reality.
nature of the universe in Jainism is based on the nature of reality
which possess triple characteristics, utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. The
things that exist cannot be destroyed and the things that do not exist
cannot be originated from a realistic standpoint, but they get
transformed into their own attributes and modes from a practical point
of view.29 This system of realities results in the universe
being in finite as well as eternal in character. The entire universe,
according to Jainism, is a compendium of the six Dravyas which are a
permutation and combination of atoms. The atom in Jainology is the
smallest unitary part of pudgala. It is characterised by its internal
cohesion (sneha) and indivisible unity. a molecule (anu), a kombination
of atoms, results in an aggregate of matter (skandha)30. Anui
is an indivisible entity and cannot be perceived by ordinary men.
is always transformed into skandha and paramanu. The upadana karana
(substantive cause) and the nimitta karana (external cause) are
responsible for these modifications. For instance, in the manufacturing
of apot, clay is the substantive cause and the potter, stick, water,
etc. are external causes. Each and every entity runs through these two
causes and gets its similar modes.
the univers in Jaina philosophy is undivided, uncreated, eternal,
self-existent, and infinite from realistic standpoint; while from a
practical standpoint of its inter-related parts it is transitory,
phenomenal, evanescent, and finite. This theory rejects all the other
theories based on the absolute standpoint such as Kalavada, Svabhavavada,
Niyativada, Yadrechavada, Purusavada, Isvarvada, Bhutavada, etc.
doctrine of karman seems to have developed against these doctrines of
creation. According to Janiism, the vibrations (yoga) and the passions (ksayas)
of soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. Soul is
pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of karmas is a cause that
makes its cycling into births. This is the nature of bondage. Soul,
which is amurtd (spiritual), is affected by karmas which are murta
(material). This concrete association of the spiritual and the meterial
leads to the existence of universe, which is beginningless. The material
karman (dravyakarman) is a avarana (cover) which brings about the
bhavakarman (its spirtinal counterpart) that is called dosa like
privation and perversion. This is the mutual relation as cause and
effect of both these karmas.
are classified into eight main types, viz. (1) Jnanavarana
(knowledge-obscuring). (2) Darsanbavarana (vision-obscuring). (3)
Vedaniya (feeling-producing). (4) Mohaniya (deluding). (5) Ayu
(longevity determining). (6) Nama (body-making). (7) Gotra (status
determining, and (8) Antaraya (obstructive).
karmas are sub-divided into one hundred and forty eight which may be
seen in detail in Gomattasara
inflow of karmic matter into the soul is called Asrava and the bondage of the soul by karmic matter is called Bandha
in Jainism. Both are related mutually to each other as cause and effect.
Asrava isthe antecedent and anterior cause of bondage. The stoppage of
inflow of karmic matters into the soul is called Samvara
and the shedding of karmic matters by the soul is cailed Nirjara.
Evil thoughts and miseries lead to a suffering in the world as well as
in hell. The happiness of salvation.31
the Samvara and Nirjara lead to the destruction of the karmas and reveal the purity
of self, which is called Moksa
Umasvami says that Moksa is a state of freedom from all karmic matter
owing to the destruction of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of
the karmas32. Pujyapada in the Sarvarthasiddhi
defines moksa "as the
state of the highest condition of purification, unthinkable inherent
attitude of knowledge and unobstructed bliss, of a soul which becomes
totally free from the defect of karmic dirt and is liberated from the
Dharma and Adharma
and adharma dravyas convey special meanings ih Jainism. Dharma
is accepted as a kind of Ether which helps us in motion. Pudgala
and Jiua move with the help of
dharma as fish move with the
help of water. Adharma is the exact opposite of dharma.
It assists Pudgalas and Jiuas
in staying as a shadow assists travellers to rest 34.
in Jainism provides a place for all substances to exact. It is said to
be anantapradesi (possessing
infinite pradesas) amurtika
(having a non-physical factor), and niskriya
(inactive), and savayaui
(having parts). It is of two kinds, lokakasa
and alokakasa. The former is
co-extensive with the dravyas, whereas the latter is devoid of this
characheristic. Loke consists
of three divisions, Uadholoka
(middle world_, and Adholoka (lower world). They are the abodes of celestial beings, men
and other creatures, and the inmates of hell. Beyond this Likakasa
which is said to be eternal, infinite, formless, without activity and
perceptible only by the omnisscient 35
in Jainism is divided into two categories, ByauaharaKala
and Paramarthikakala. The
former helps to change substances into their modes and the latter is
undersrood from continuity. Time is not an appearance but a reality
since we experience it in the form of hours, minutes etc. 36
Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature
references fo six dravyas of Jainism are found in the pali Canon as well
as in later Sanskrit Buddhist literature. They aer however, not referred
to in a systematic order,.
The Jaina Conception of Soul (Jiva).
the course of a conversation with Sakya Mahanama, the Buddha speaks of
Nigantha Nataputta's doctrine as follows:
there is an evil deed that was formerly done by you, ger rid of its
consequences by severe austerity, To keep away from of body ( kayena
samvuta), control of soeech (vacaya samvuta), and control of
by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the nondoing of new
deeds, there is no transmission of modes in the future for him. Form
there being no transmission in future is the destruction of deeds (ayatim anavassavo), from
the destruction of deeds is the destruction of ill, from the destruction
of ill is the destruction of feeling, from the destruction of feeling
all ill become worn away." The Buddha says further, "That is
approved by us; it is pleasing to us: therefore we are delighted37."
is a comprehensive introduction to the seven states or Tattvas of the Jainas. The thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta
represented in this passage are as follws:
The existence of Soul.
Sukha of Duhkha is due to previous karmas done.
By ascetic practices with right knowledge on could get rid of the
effects of karmic matter.
On the complete stoppage of karmic matter,Dukkhas would be arrested, and
without dukkha there would be no Vedana
(feeling).and the absence of Vedana leads to the end of dukkhas and this
is called moksa. Here the first point represents Jive and ajiva, the second
represents the asrave and the bandha,
and the third point stands for samvara
and nirjara, and the last corresponds to Moksa.
Brahmajalasutta in the Dighanikaya
refers to the sixty-two contemporary philosophical views which fall into
two categoris namely Pubantanuditthi
indicating the ultinate beginningless of things concerned with the
ultinate passt on eighteen grounds, and the aparantanuditthi
concerned with the future on forty-four grounds. All the current views
of that tine have been classified into these two groups, as the Buddha
himself says that there is no other conception beyond them (natthi
to pubbantanuditthis, theviews
about the be ginning of things in eighteen ways are as follows 39:
Some (sassatatvadis) hold in
four ways that the soul (atta)
and the universe (loka are
Some (Ekaccasassatavadis) hold
in four ways that the soul and universe are in sone resoects eternal and
in sone not.
Some (antanantavadis) hold
that the universe is finite or infinite or finite and infinite, or
neither finite nor infinite.
wriggle like eels in four ways and refuse a clear answer.
assert in two ways that the soul and the universe have arisen without a
the context of showing the aparantanuditthis40
(views abowt the future), the Buddha mentions then in forty-four ways:
Some (Uddhamafhatanika asnnivadis)
hold in sixteen ways that the soul is conscious after death.
Some (Uddhamaghatamika asannivadis)
hold in eight ways the it is unconscious after death.
Some (Uddhamaghatanika nevasnni-nasannivadis) hold in eight ways that it is neither conscious nor
unconscious after death.
Some (Ucchedavadis) hold in
seven ways the annihilation of the soul.
hold that nibbana consists in
the enjoument of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of
sense or one of the four trances.
of these conceptions, the theories of Uddhamaghata
nika sannivada should be mentioned here, according to which the soul is
conscious and eternal. The Buddha says: "Thete ate brethern,
recluses and Brahmanas who maintin in sixteen ways, that the soul after
death is conscious and it is not a subject to decay. "The sixteen
ways are as follows41:
Soul has form (rupi atta hoti
arogo param marana sanni)-
is formless (arupi atta hoti arogo
Soul has and has not form (rupi ca
arupi atta hoti).
neither has nor has not form (nevarapi
narupi atta hoti).
is finite (antava atta hoti)
is infinite (anantava atta hoti).
is both (antava ca anantava ca
is neither (nevantava nanantava ca
has one mode of consciousness (ekattasanniatta
has various motes of consciousness (nan
ittasanni atta hoti).
has limited consciousness (parittasanni
has infinite consciousness (appamanasanni
is altogether happy (ekantasukhi
is altogether miserable (elamtadilljo
is both (sukhadukkhi atta hoti).
is neither (adukkhamasukhi atta
list of sixteen theories regarding the nature of soul is also referred
to in the Udana42. The topics listed there are said to be
debated by many Sananas and Brahmanas,and they are the same type of conception of the soul as we
find in the section of Uddhamaghatanika
sannivada. Thesame points ate also treated somewjtat dofferemt;u in
the list of undeternined questions43. There several other
places also in pali literature where such questions had been
of these views mentioned above, the thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta can be detected. As we have already seen
Buddhaghosa thought that Jainism was a combination of eternalism and
nihilism. If this is due to an early Buddhist tradition, the Nigantha
Nataputta's views might have been recorded in Pali Literature under
these two sections. The sassatavada
indicatesthe eternality of soul which should have been mentioned fron
the realistic standpoint and Ucchedavada points out the non-eternality
of soul which should have been explained from practical standpoint. That
means soul is eternal and having consciousness according to mscayanaya,
and it is non eternal and is a subhect to change in its modifications
from the viewpoint of vyavaharanaya.
Itis also pointed out that soyl is extended over all parts of bidy which
is very similar to the view of Jainas. Jainism is also of view that soul
is formless and is possessed of consciousness45. Buddhaghosa
also referred to this view of Jainas46.
Describes the theories of atta (soul) as follows:
Atta has a a forn and is
composed of the four elements enjoying food. Thes is the theory of
material soul (O arikam kho, aham
bhante, attanam paccemi rupim catumahabhutikam kabalikaraharabhakkham ti).
Atta is made of mind (nanonaya)
comprising of all parts and not devoid of sense-organs (manonayan kho aham bhante attanam paccemi sabbangapaccangim ahimndriyam
Atta is formless and with consciousness (arupim
kho aham, bhante, attanam paceemi sannamayam ti).
Consciousness is different from Atta (anna
va sanna anna va atta ti).
of these theories, Guruge is of view thet the first theory probably
belonge to the Jainas, for Jainism flourished in the sane region where
the Buddha was active48. As a matter of fact, this theory
belongs to the Carvaka philosophy accrding to which soyl, like body, is
a congregation of the four elements49. Nosuch view is
accepted by jaina philosophy. The third wiew can be, of course,
recognised as the Jaina theory of soyl, for soul in Jainism is accepted,
as we have already seen, formless and conscious.
mentions that according to the Jainas,the soul is eternal by nature. and
it makes extension according to the body50.
Catuhsataka also pointed out
that according to sone philosophers the soul is spread over the entire
body. It shringks and extends according to the dimensions of the body of
man or aninal. Therefore,a bee, bird, elephant, etc, have their souls in
proportion to their bodies51. This view mentioned in the Catuhsataka is definirely related to the Jaina theory of soul.
Umasvati says that by the contraction and ezpansion of the pradesas, the
soul expands according to the body, as the light from a lamp gets
expansion and contraction according to the room. That is the reason why
a soyl can occpy the space represented by an ant or an elephaht52.
Santaraksita in his Tattvasangraha
wrote a separate chaoter entitled Atma
pariksa or the examination of Soul.He there refuted most of the
relevant theories. In this context he established the theory of soul
according to the Jainas and then refuted it on the basis of the doctrine
of momentariness of Buddhism.
theory of soyl] according to the Jainas' as he describad, has been
established throwgh Dravyarthikanaya (successive factors point of view)
(successive factors point of view). He says: the soyl has the
charcteristic of consciousness only (cillaksana
evatma).In the form of substance,it remains the same under all
states (anugatatnaka or comprehensive) by nature, while in the form of
successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is exclusive in
its nature (vyavrtyatmaka).This
two-fold character of soul is cognised by direct perceprion, and does
not stand in need of being proved by other evidence. thus consciousness
which continues to exist through all states, even though these states
are diverse, is a form of pleasure and rest, from the substance
standpoint, while the successive factors consist of the diverse states
which appearone after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived53.
further explains the above view of Jainas stating of behalf of them that
of the substance wete absolutely different from the successive factors,
then no difference in it would be possible; because on the ground of
their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held
to be one. As a matter of fact, however, the two are different as
regatds number is that the substance is one, while the successive
factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is
distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one while its colour and
the rest are many. In this way. their functions, etc, are also
different, Thus substance is not absolutely different from the
successive factors. Therefore, soul and its modes are also not
absolutely different. Having the characteristic of consciousness, it is
eternal and constant fron the view of substance, wtile from the view of
successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain,
Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of
Narasimha, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of
soul. For,the soul is impartiate (nirbhaga); therefore it exists in the
joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately55.
theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by Santaraksita, is also
raferred to by Arcata in his Hetubindutika56.
The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main
defect, according to them, in this theory, is the selfcontradiction,
which is not accepted by the Jainas, Santaraksita urged that one entity
cannot bave two forms. Ke puts forward two points in support of his
view.He says if there is an wumodified substance in connection with
successive factors,there is on difference in it, and in that case, it is
not liable to be modified57. Oneness between substance and
its modes will involve the substance to be distribured like the forms of
successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed
into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and
the theory will be disproved58.As regards Narasimha.he
says. it is an aggregate of many atoms, that is whyot seems dual in
nature (anekanusanuhatma sa
ThuSantaraksita, as well as Arcata60, refutes the theory on
the ground that one. cannot bave two forms. Otherwise the eternality and
the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable.
a matter pf factthe dual characteristic, of soul is based on the
standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the Buddhist
philosophers. The view of Jainas against these objections will be
discussed in the chapter on Syadvada.
Moreover, we can point ont here that there is no selg-contradiction
problem through Non-absolutistic standpoint.
Ajive or Pudgala (matter): Nature of Karmas
mundane soul attract the karmas and then they stand towards each other
in relationship of phenonenal conjunction. Therelation, according to
Jainism, is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation. Soul
and Karmas can be dissociated as they ate two separate entities.
Literature cantains some valuable references to the jaina doctrine of
Karma. Triyoga is themost
significant aspect of Jaina ethics in that it explains the origin of
karmas and their attachment to the soul through the three means of word,
deed, and theought.This is also called the tridanda
Karma61. The Buddha also recognises the tridanda
Karma but in a spme&wtjat dofferent way. It is well known fow the
Buddha generally gave new meanings to old philosophical and ethical
terms and taught new doctrines based on them. The famous triyoga
ortridanda doctrine was
originally a Jaina dogma. The Buddha himself has ascribed it ro Nigantha
Nataputta before refuting it. He asks a Nigantha named Dighatapassi in
Nalanda as how many kinds of wrong doing bring about about evil effects
according to the teaching of Nigantha Nataputta? Dighatapassi in Nalanda
as how many kinds of wrong doings bring about evil effects according to
the teaching of Nigantha Nataputta/ Dighatapassi replied that the Kayadanda
is most heinous 62
danda means duccarita or wrong behaviour in body, speech and thought, which
brongs nmisery and distress to the muldane soul. The Buddha recognised kayakanmma,
Vacikamma and Manokamma in
place of kayadanda, vacidanda
andmanodanda. The Dispute between the Buddha and the Jainas on the
use of Kamma and Danda is apparently due to the distinct connotation the term Karma
has to each system. To the Buddhist it signifies volitional action while
to the Jaina it is the endproduct of action which clings on to the soul
in a material form. Both Danda
and Kamma bave the same
meaning in Jainism. The use of the word Danda
in the sense of Kamma can be seen in the Thanange
more important difference of opinion between the Buddha and Nigantha
Nataputta relates to the relative ethical sigmificance of deed, word or
thought? The Buddha says that the nost heinous is thought (manoodanda) while Nigantha Nataputta is said to have held deed (kayadanda)
to be the worst.
reference in Upali Sutta of
the Manodanda. Nikaya to the
disput gives the impression that the Niganthas did not realise the
inportance of the mind or manodanda.
It is reslly not so and it needs further clarification. Nigantha
Nataputta did not, at any stage, envisage dodily action which is devid
of intention and volition.Involuntary acts-such as miatakes and
accidents do not fall within the purview of Kayadanda. Only such action as is preceded by thought is Kayadanda
and the true significance of Nigantha Nataputta's attitude to three-fold
action can be conveyed when kayadanda
is translated and understood not as mere bodily action but as
"thought converted into action."
Kundakunda condemned asceticism, if it is unaccompanied by intention (bhava).
The guilt or otherwise of an action depends on the nature and intensity
of thougth and intention. If one is ever thinking of causing harm to
another, he is guilty of malicious thought even though he does not
actually cause any injury, while another, who, with no intention of
causing any injury, becomes unconsciously the instrument of injury,
should not be morally held responsible for that act. For instance, a
burglar who fails in robbing after attemping to do so, is to be punished
as a felon; and a surgeon, even though his patient may die during an
operation skillfully performed with all attention, is not held
responsible for such a deat63. Butif any wrong is
intentionally committed, he is, of course, more responsible and blamable
for such "wrong" than he who merely harbours malicious thought
but does not actually cause any injury:
hi himsa himsaphalabhajanam bhavatyekah.
pyaparo himsa himsa himsaphalabhajanam na ayat64.
in Jainism the Kayadanda is worse than either Manodanda
or Vacidanda. The Buddha
indicated the same idea but defined its characteristics in a different
manner. This is one area where the two do not really disagree, Jainism,
like Buddhism, is a religion that gives inportance to intention before
an ethical judgement is made of any action.
reference in thes connection is found in the Anguttara Nikaya where Nigantha
Nataputta is designated Kriyavadi
(activist),while the Buddha is said to be both kriyavadi and akriyavadi.
An episode relates fow siha, the General of Licchavis, asked for
permission to meet the Buddha, and how Nigantha Nataputta did not allow
him to do so saying that the Buddha taught the akriyavada.
However, Siha decided to meer the Buddha and verified at once whether he
is akriyavadi. In response to
this question the Buddha said that he is both Kriyavadi
and akriyavadi. He is akriyavadi
in the sense that he taught beings how to abstain from evil actions, and
he is kriyavadi in the sense that he taught them how to perform good
deeds. The Buddha's reply is as follows:-
is a way in which one might say of me that the ascetic Gotama bolds the
principle of non-action, teaches the doctrine of non-action, and by this
leads his disciples; and there is a way in which one might rightly say
of me that the ascetic Gotama folds the principle of action? I proclaim
the non-doing of various kinds of wickes and evil things. And how might
one say of me that the ascetic Gotama folds the principle of action? I
proclaim the doing of good conduct of body. speech. and thought. I
proclaim the doing of various kinds of good thingas 65".
question arises here as to why Nigantha
Nataputta criticised the Buddha as an Akriyavadi?
And why the buddha gave an answer like this/ the Satrakrtanga includes Buddhists among the Akriyavadins, since they
do not accept the existence of soul and hence deny karman as well66.
Further it describes the types of Akriyavada
On the dissolution of the five elements, i.e. earth, water, fire, wind,
air, living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution fo body the
individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul
exists as long as the body exists.
When a man acts or causes another to act. it is not his soul, which acts
or causes to act (Sukr.i.1.1.33).
There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six
substances are imperishable.
Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls
thenselves, but the individual souls experience them.
The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced
from chaos. (SuKr. 220.127.116.11).
The world is boundless and eternal.
these views ate reduced to four main types that correspond to those
associated in the Pali Nikayas
with four leading thinkers of the tine, e.g. atheism like that of Ajita.
etermalism like that of Katyayana, absolutism like that of Kasyapa and
fatalism like that of Gosala.
types of Kriyavada that do not
come up to the standard of Jainism are the following:
The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bed karma on
reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled
through pleasant excitement ot hatred.
if a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it
for a baby, hf will be guilty of murder
this definition of Satrakrianga
is also not altogether an adequate summary of the doctrine of Kriyavada and Akriyqvada,
In another place the same work presents the characteristics in a better
way. It says: the Kriyavada
teaches that the soul exists, acts, and is affected by acts, and this
held by the Jainas fn common with the Vaisesikas and Nyaya schools. The akriyavada means a doctrine, according to which the soul dose not
act or is not effected by acts. It is held, according to the Jaina view,
by the Buddhists in common with the vedanta, Sankhya and Yoga schools68.
It is,therefore, in the light of the negation of a soul by the Buddha
that Nigantha Nataputta called him an Akriyavadin.
appears to hold that the Buddhists fall into the akriyavada category, for they denied the existence of a soul. But,
as a matter of fact, the mere denial of the existence of a soul does not
nean that Buddhism should be included into akriyavada.
The Buddha believes fully in moral responsibilities and the ethical
consequences of both good and bad acts, words, and thoughts. He fully
accepted the doctrine of karma which governs the cycles of rebirth.
Apparently the Jainas wete not fully aware of these facts of Buddhist
ethics. But it is somewthat surprising as the contemporary philosopherly
the teachings of Makkhali gosala, a contemporary nohilist, on the ground
reference to the karma doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta is found in the
Majjhima Nikaya. According to that the inflow of karmas can be stopped
by performing severe penance with right knowledge69. The
familiarity with the karma theory of Jainas can also be traced in the
Mahabodhi Jataka70. It is said there that once the
Bodhisattve was born in the family of a Brahmana. When he came of age,
he renounced the world and became a mendicant and lived at the
Himalayas. During the rainy season he caoe down and going on his begging
rounds he gradually appproached Benares. there he took up his abode in
the royal park, and on the followinbg day he got his meal from the king.
Afterwards, the king had a hut of leaves built for him and used to come
to pay his respect to the mendicant daily thrice a day. And so twelve
the king had five counsellors who advised him on temporal and spiritual
matters. One of then denied the existence of cause (karma). Another
believed everything was the act of a Supreme Being. A third professed
the doctrine of previous actions.A fourth believed in annihilation at
death. Afifth held the Ksatriya doctrine. He who denied the cause taughe
the people that existence in this world was purified by rebirte. He who
believed in the action of Supreme Being tatght that the world was
created by hi,. He who belieced in the consequences of previous acts
tayght that sorrfow or joy that befalls man here is the result of some
previous action. The beliver in annihilation taught no one passed hence
to another world, but that this world is annihilated. He who professed
the ksatriya creed taught that one's own interest is to be desired even
at the cost of killing one's parents. These men were appointed to sit in
judgement in the king's court and being greedy of bribes they
dispossessed the rightful owner of property.
o these, the third counsellor seems to bave represented the thoughts of
Migantha Nataputta who preached that all things happenen in life are due
to the previous karmas. Such previous karmic matter, though present,
begin to operate only when they become mature and then they produce
corresponding psychic states through which they bind the self71.
Bodhisattva of the Mahabodhi
Jataka criticised this theory theory along with other theories
belonging to the five counsellors of the king. It is said there that
while he accepted the offer of the king to be judge of his court, he
became very popular withim a short perid. The five coumsellors got angry
with him and tried to convince the king that the Bodhisattve was seeking
sovereingty, Hence the king diminished the fonours paid to him and made
plans to slay him. The Bodhisattva come to know all these things and
went again towards the kimalaya.
five counsellors in order to prevent him from coming again in the city
publicised that the Bodhisattva with the help of the queen wanted to
slay the king. As a result, the queen was put to death. Hence the sons
became enemies of th king. In the meantine the Bodhisattva came to know
this conspiracy and came to the city to save the life of the king. He
entered a frontier village and after eating the flesh of a monkey given
to him by the inhabitants he begged for its skin. Which he had dried in
his hermit's hut. He went then to the city of Benares and had himself
seated in the park on the without any response the Bodhisattva began to
rub the monkey's skin. The king asked why he was doing so? The
codhisattva replied that the monkey was very useful to me but I ate its
flesh. The counsellors thought that this man is guilty of taking the
life of a monkey. The Boddshisattva, adderssing one by one, denied their
charge and criticised therir theories.
third counsellor's thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of
a monkey. The Boddhisattva, addressing one by one, denied their chatge
and criticised theories.
third counsellor's theory which is supposes to have represnted Jainism
is criticised as follown:
former action still both bliss and woe again:
monkey pays his debt, to wit, tis former sin:
act a debt discharged, where then does guilt come in?
such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true,
was my action right when I that monkey slew.
thou but only see him sinful is thy creed.
wouldst no longer then with reason blame my deed72.
majjhima Nikaya73 also supports the jaina theory of Karmas.
According to the Jaina Agamas, Soul enjoys all sorts of fruits of Karmas
done 74. As regards the criticism of this theory made by the
Buddha, it does not provide any substantial argument. moreover the Mahabodhi
jataka is a later development.of the Jataka literature. Ailanka
refets to only 500 Jataka stories belonging to the Jatakas 75.
which shows its nature of development.
the Anguttara Nikaya76 the
same idea is found in traditional doctrional doctrines of inaction (tinimam bhikkhave titthayatanam yani panditehi samanuyunjiyamanam
akiriyaya Aanthahanti) They ate as follows:-
There are certain recluses and the Brahmanas who hold the view that
"whatever happiness or misery or neutrel feeling is experienced,
all that is due to some previous action (yain
kim cayajm purisapuggalo patisanvedeti sukham ya dukkham ua
adukkhamasukham va sabbm tam pubbekatahetu ti)
All the pleasure and misery ate due to a Supreme Deity (issaranimmanahetu).
Others teach that all such pleasure and misery are uncaused and
unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya).
of these three theories the first is undoubtedly related to the doctrine
of Nigantha Nataputta. Criticising this view, the Buddha pointed out
that owing to previous actions, men will become murderers, stealers,
unchaste, liars, etc, For those who fall back on oast deeds as the
essential cause of present action, there is neither desire to do, nor
effort to do, nor would they consider it to do this deed or abstain from
that deeed. The necessity ofr action of inaction not being foune to
exist in truth, the term Samana cannot reasonably be applied to
yourselves, since you live in a state of bewildering with faculties
the argument raised by the Buddha against the first theory is that if
all is due to the preevious karmas, then it is not essential to make
effort to abstain from them. This conception might have been known to
Nigantha Nataputta when he accused the BuddHA as an Akriyavadi
(Non-actionist).Acarya Kundakunda=78 is of opinion that all
the previously bound karmic matters operate onle when they become
mature. The Nigantha Nataputta prescribed severe penance with perfect
knowledge to destroy the karmas. The Buddha himself, as we have already
seen, expresses his satisfaction with regard to the theory79.
Anguttara Nikaya80 Describes
the sixbreeds (chalahbhijali)
as the different categories of beings,as declared by Puran Kassapa. They
Black breed (kanhabhijati pannatta)
category includes the mutton-butchers, Jailers, etc.
blue breed (nilabhijati pannatta)
includes the monks who live as though with a thorn in the side and all
others who profess the deed and doing so (bhikkhu kantakavittika ye va
pana anepi keci kammavada
the third is the red breed (lohitabhijati pannatta) the category to
which Niganthas belong;
the fourth is yellow breed (haliddabhijati)
which includes the white-robed householders and followers of the
the fifth is the white breed (sukkabhijati)
which includes the Ajivikas.
the last is the purest white (paramasukkabhijati)
in which Purana kassapa is included.
Buddha hears of this division from Ananda to whom later on he declares
the six breeds according to his own conception. Thews six divisions are
mainly divided into two divisions, black and white. This division is
based on the good and bad karmas of man. The Jainas also have about the
same division into six categories, but they are not mentioned in Pali
literatute. The Jainas have the particular word Lesya
for such division
Lesyas are different stages of
soul influenced by different karmas and activities of mind. They are
classified into six naing types, viz.
krsna (black), nila
(blue), kapota(grey), pita(yellow),
padma (pink) and sykla81 (white).These are nothing but the states of beings based on
their activities of mind. The krsna
is the worst lesya of the first three and the pita is the least puer of the latter three lesyas. According to another division, these six divisions are
classified into two divisions, dravyalesya
and dhavalesya. This is
similar to the classification made by the Buddha and the Yogasastra. 82 Since the conception of lesyas is not
mentioned in the Pali Canon, we can say that it may have originated
later in Jainology as sn imitation of Sramana traditions.
Anguttara Nikaya 83 describes
three kinds of yoga (manasa,
vacana and kaya) which cause the karmic matter into the soul due to
ignorance (avijja). It is said
there that at Kapilavatthu, Vappa84 a follower of Nigantha
Nataputta went to visit Moggalayana. Moggalayana asked Vappa "There
is some one here, Vappa, restrained in body, speech and thought owing to
the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge (kayena,
samvuto, vacaya samvuto, manasa samvuto avijjaviraga vijjuppada). He
then asked Vappa whether he perceives any cause owing to which the asavas causing pain would flow upon the man at some future time. (passasino
tuam vappa, tam thanam yato mdanam purisam dukkavedaniya asava
assaveyyun abhisamparayam 'ti) Vappa then replied "sir, I do
see such reason. There may be in this casa a certain evil deed whose
fruit has not yet ripened. owing to the asavas causing pain
might flow in wpon that man at some future time
bhante, tam thanam idhassu bhante pubbepapakammam katam avipakkavipakam
tato nidanam purisam dukkhavedaniya asava assaveyyum abhisamparayam).
this juncture, the Buddha came there and having a conversation he asked
vappa "As to these asavas
which come about as a result of bodily activities, in the case of one
who sustains from bodily activities that causes vexation and distress,
it follows that thoes asavas causing pain do not exist in him.He does
not do fresh deeds. as to tis former deed; he wears it out of constant
contact with is, by a wearing out that is plain to see,not just for a
time, one that asks for inspection that leads onward a wearing out that
can be understood by the intelligent each for himselg. The same is
repeated in the context ofvacisamarambhhapaccaaaya and
manosamarambhapaccaya. The Buddha repeated thrice this question.
Upali answered it in the words "that cannot be". Further, the
Buddha explained his views. He said: "Vappa, by the monk, whose
heart is perfectly released, six constant abiding&states (satatavihara)
are attained. He, seeing an object with the eye, is neither elated nor
depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful and comprehending. Hearing a
sound with the ear...smelling a scent with the nose...tasting a savout
with the tongue...with body contacting tangibles..with mind cogizing
mental states he is neither elated not depressed, but rests in
different, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by
body, he knows that he so feels. He knows: when body breaks up, after
life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure
and grow cold. Suppose, Vappa, that shadow is cast by a stump. Then
comes a man with axe and basket and cuts down that stump by the root, so
doing he digs all round it, Having done so he pulls up the roots, even
the rootlets and root-fibres. He chops that stump into logs and having
done so chops the og ingo chips. The chips he dries in wind and sun,
then burns them with fire, then makes an ash-heep. The ash-heap he
winnows in a strong wind or lets the ash be carried away by a swifty
flowing river. Verily, Vappa, that shadow cast because of the stump,made
not to become again, of a nature not to arise againg in future time.
Just in the same way, Vappa, by a monk , whose heart is the released,
six nonstant abiding-places are won.He seeing an object with the
eye...with mind cognizing mental states, is neither elated nor
depressed, but abides indifferednt, mindful and comprehending, when he
feels a feeling limited by body...limited by lite, he knows that be so
feels. He kmows: When body breaks up, after lite is used up,all my
experiences in this world will lose their luer and grow old. "85
is no substantial argument, in favt, in this criticism by the Buddha.
Yoga attracts the karmic matter towards the soul and connects the same
with it. The soul is obscured by such karmic matter since time
immemorial. That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad.
That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. The
destruchion of Karmas, according to Jainism, depends on the restraint of
mind, word, any body. By severe penance one can destroy all the past
deeds and prevent the flow of new karmas. 86
Anguttara Nikaya 87 refers to the five ways of
falling into sin, according to Nigantha Nataputta. They are destruction
of animates (panatipata), takiong what is not given (adinnadayi..),
passion enjoument of evil (abrahmacari.),
speaking a lie (musavadi...),
and living on liquor and drink (suramerayamajjapamadatthayi..),
The Digha Nikaya88 mentions
the catuyamasmvara of Nigantha
Nataputta. These are the references to the Pancanuvratas
of Jainas which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Buddha at another place in the Amguttara
Nikaya89 says to Visakha that the Niganthas took a vow not to go
beyond the East, West, North or the South. This vow saves them from
violence at least in the prescribed limitation. This vow saves them from
violence at least in the prescribed limitation. The Prosadhopavasa also
is said to be a way to destroy the karmas.90
other ways to make a purified soyl also are recorded in Pali literature.
One becomes completely naked with no desire or attachment towards
anything in the last stage of ascetism. In this acelakatva
he should follow a lot of rules and regulations which have been
mentioned in the Pali Canon as weel as in the jaina Agama. These will be
discussed in the chapter on Ethics.
well-known reference of the Majjhima
Nikaya to the severe panance of Jainas indicates the state of moksa
according to Jaina philosophy. The Buddha says that...by severe penance
all the sufferings will be destroyed (sabbamdukkhamnijjimmam
bhavissati). The means the freedom from all karmic matter is moksa
or Salvation according th Jainism.91 Kundakunda says: that if
the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses
and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. When the springs of
karmas thus get blocked the dravay
karmas get repulsed. When the dravay
karmas completely disappeat. the person becomes all-knowing and
all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends
the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of lite:
niyama jayadi nanissa asavanirodho.
vina jayadi kammassa bu nirodho.
va savvanhu savvaloya dassi ya.
indiyarahidam avvavaham suhamanantam 92
common topics, which ate said to have been debated by th Samanas Brahmanas and Pariabajakas,
are referred to in Pali literature. The Jaina conception of the nature
of Universe also appears to be recorded in the Brahmhjala sutta. The
four different propsitions maintained by contemporary teachers in this
connection are as follows 93:
This world is finite and circumscribed (antava
ayam liko pariyanto)
It is infinite and without limit (anantava
ca ayam loko apariyanto)
It is both finite and infinite (antava
ca ayam loko apariyanto)
It is neiter finite nor infinite (nveayam
loko antava na panananto)
third theory appears to be the view of Nigantha Nataputta. Buddhaghosa
does not clarify this view. He suggests on!y that the limited or
unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited
view taken by the eontemplator in his mently perception ro vision,94.
Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If
we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be
easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the stand-ppoint of
wubstance (dravua) and place (ksetra), the world is limited and from
the standpoint of kala and bhava it is wnlimited.
of theories held at the time have been repeated severla times in pali
literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been
mentioned ferore. The later Buddhist provides us with more data in this
respect. It indicates a development of the concept under discussion.
refers to a view of Acarya Suri, a Jaina philosopher, in the course of
refuting the doctrine of the "thing by itself" (svabhavavada),
which thrown light on the Jaina conception of the nature of the
Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know
first the contezt on which it is based. It provides a common grund to
the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of
Svabhavavada. According to this doctrine, as shown in the Tattasangraha
and other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any
other things. They ate not dependent on causes. To prove this theory the
holder of this view queries, "Who makes the diversity in the lotus
and its filament? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and
such things been created. Such arguments can be raised about other
things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn
of any other thing must be regarded as nunaused, since they are around
us due to the influence of nature.95
this view, Santaraksita argues that if you do not postulate any cause,
your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate
evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Acarya Suri. He
says that Acary Sure, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same
objection in the theory of "thing by itself", as he says,
"One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own
conclusion, it he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on
the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained
by mere assertion? 96
the wiew of Suri refereed to by Santaraksita appeats to be in coformity
with Jainism. The theoty of Svabhavao vada is accurate as far as the
opposition to the theoty that a God controls the universe is concerned,
but if it carries the meaning of ahetukavada, it cannot be admitted by
the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses
innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other
material also. For instance, the alay can produce the jar, but it also
depends on the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotus comes out
of mud, which is a cauwe of its fragrance and beauty. Therefore, the
view that only nature (svabhava) is responsible for the origination of thins, is
inadmissible to the Jainism. The Sutrakrtanga
also criticises the view of Svabhavavada:
kantakanam prkaroti taiksnyam,
kamacarosti kutah prayatnah 97
reference to the jaina concption of the nature of the Universe is
recorded by Santaraksita in his examination of the externa world.
Kamalasila, the well-known cmmentator of Santaraksita, explains the view
saying that the universe accordingly is non-perception of external
world. They describe its nature as resembling of things (pratibimbimbadisannisbham).
In support of this assertion they say that the entire universe
comprising the threefold phenomena (subjective or immaterial, objective
or meterial, and immaginary ot fictitios) is mere "ideation".
This ideation through the diversity of the "chain of
causation" is endless and impure, for they havenot realised the
truth; but is is pure for those whose karmas have been got rid of.
Kamalasila further delineates the nature of the universe according to
Buddhism saying that the universe is in perpetual flux and affects all
living things. This idea of the entire universe is based on two
points-(1) there can be no apprehender of the external world, being
non-existent, and (2) every cognition is devoid of both
"apprehender" and "apprehended", because it is
main ground for establishimg this principle is that the perception of a
thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is
responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, asstated by
Acarya Aryadeva in his philosophical work Catuhsataka,
"the corpse of a woman is considered in varius forms, The sage
considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man
thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the
other hand. perceives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world
is nothing but only the fiction of imagioation. If it is not so, reality
should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole wniverse without
any sort of sankeka or samskara,
this context Santaraksita refers to the view of sumati and then fefutes
it from the Buddhist point of view. Acarya Sumati 98 argues
accordimgly that Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination
of atoms which exist in two forms,viz the common and wucommon. Of these
the common form is apprehended by the senses and the form of the atoms
which is uncommon is held to be held to be amenable to mystic
perception." That means the compendium of atoms, the so called
Skandha is the univeerse, which we perceive, and the atoms, which are so
subtle that they cannot be perceived by us are perceived by the
the external world in the view of Jainism is not imagination, but a
multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception fo an entity
which represents the external world is based on knowlege of feeling.
since an entity has different names it can be fictitious but its
existence cannot be ignored. The entity is paramartha
sat like knowledge or vujnanas.
Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be
dependent on knowledge. The ordinary man, but it does not mean that they
ate not tn existence. 99.
does not agtee with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded
assumpti0ons of some dull witted persons (durmatayat) He argues that the
two different forms of a thing must be differdnt from each other. It
cannot, therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms.
The second and the nost towching argument is raised to the effect that
as the particular form of an entity is not entirely defferent from the
universatl form, there would be a possibility of the fromer being
apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could not be the cleat
cut distinction that "The common form is anenable to sense
cognition and the wneommon form is amenable to mystic cognition."100
above objections are met by the jaina philosophers. They say that from
the point of view of dravayarthikanaya,
reality is the same but from the paryayarthikanaya
standpoint its modes are differednt from each other. On the basis of the
conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for selfconteadiction.101
Nature of word
in the Tattvasangraha refers
to a view of the Mimamsakas regarding the nature of the word with the
idea of establishing his own theory. The mimamsakas hold the view that
the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Vede. Therefore it
is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin (apauruseya).
In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by
various philosophers regarding the exact nature of werd Among them the
Jainas are said to have hele the view that the word is atomic in
character (audgalo Digambaraih)
102 Inthe following karika two types of words are mentioned,
vez Universal (Samanya) and
particular (visesa) which ate
the main features of the Jaina conception of reality.
the establishing of his own viewm Santaraksita criticised the mimamsakas'
conception, but he ded not refute the Jaina conception separately. He
proved the falsity of the common types of words while criticising the
view of the Mimamskas. He set up a theory that the Veda is not an
authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in chatacter
and non-eternal in form.
regards the divine origing of the Veda (apauruseyavada)
both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers of noe and the same path. The
arguments against the Mimamskas' view are based on their own fundamental
principles, and therefore, they differ in some places.
Buddhists say that words are not representative of their meanings,
because they are used even for denoting the past and future realities.
If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be
restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think
that the word signifies only the inaginary universalised reality 103
the other hand, the jainas postulate a theory that words are of two
kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the
existence of the external world, the6y would be meaningless and
therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible.104
Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects,
skandhapradesas, and paramanas,
Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the
differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom
which constitus the other three classes. 105 The atom cannot
be divided (paramanu ceva avibhage).106 Sound is generated by
skandhas when they strike
against one another.The sound produces by skandhas
may be natural (svabhavika) or
artificial (prayogika.)107 Thunder of cloud and the roar of
the sea are natural sound while the artiflcial sond is purposeful which
is divided into two types, bhasatmaka (language) and abhasatmaka
(non-language). The languate sound again may be aksaratmaka (articulate) and anaksaratmaka
(inarticulate). The aksaratmaka sound is made up of alphabetical sounds
while the anaksaratmaka is the
language of animals. Anaksaratmaka
sounes are of four kinds, viz. (i) tata sound produced by musical
instruments covered by leather, (ii) vitata sound produced by vina etc,
(iii) ghana produced by metallic instruments like tala, etc, and (iv)
sausire produced by wind-instruments. 108 These sounds can be
heard and recognized as they are
Dharma, Adharma, and Kala Dravyas
are no references to dharma,
adharma, and Kala Dravayas
in Pali literature. The Darmastikaya is almost similar to the paticcasamuppada
(dependent origination) of the Buddhists, but the adharmatikaya is quite
unknown to them the kala dravya
is recognized in Budhism in the form of prajnaptimatra
in the Atthasalim. 109
reference is made to the jaina conception of akasa in the Tattvasangraha
by the Mimamsaks. Santaraksita raised a question against the Mimamsakas'
view regarding the eternality ot works like ghata
(jar). They say that if the auditory organ is akasa, several objections could be brought against this theory. For
instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with
all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the
basis of the auditory organ? The Mimamsakas try to reply that akasa cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therfore it is
the auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the
Sankhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ
consisting of parts (jainairarhataih
Sankhyaissca miravavayavasya vyomah nisiddhatvat110).
and Kamalasila refute this view. They urge that if the divisible akasa
is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged
against the view "the indivisible akasa
is eternal" would become applicable.111 The defects
pointed out by Santaraksita in this theory are as follows. If akasa
is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form
"this is the same. Another argument, in support of thid idea, is
presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need
to the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from
the etetnal source, should all appear simultaneoulsy. Therefore, he
concludes that akasa is neither eternal nor consists of parts.112 In the
Abhidharma-kosa akasa (1.5) is
enumerated in the asamskrta
dharmas and described as "without covering" (tatrakasamanavrttih).113 According to Buddhaghosa, akasa
Jainas are of veiew that akasa
is eternal and consists of parts (savayava)
and having infinite parts or pradesas
it provides to Jiva and ajiva.
The etymology of akasa itself
indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or
penetrate itself.115 This entering or peneteration is
expressed by the word avagaha.116 Different places occupy different locations
of akasa. Its mani foldness
connotes, as in the case of matter itself, its possession of parts.117
brief account of the Jaina phiosophy as found in Buddhist literature
shows us that:--
the six dravyas and seven Tattvas
of Jainism were known to early Pali literature and further refuted in
Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.
Among the sixty two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the Brahmajalasutta
and some other places in the Pali Canon. The Jaina view is described as
both Ucchedavada and sassatavada.
According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of
Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in
arelationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless
and continues till one attains salvation.
Kayadanda is more heinous that
Manodanda, if a wrong deed is
committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil
or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All
is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.
The destruction of karms depends on triyoga
and severe penance with right understanding.
Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms.
Word is atomic in charcater, and
Akasa (space) is eternal and
consists of parts.
These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jaina Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.
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