Jainism in Buddhist Literature
                                                                By Dr. Hiralal Jain

Jaina Phiilaophy 

The Six Dravyas 

The term dravya or padartha (substance)in Jainism denotesany existence which possess the significant factor of persistence despite its numerous qualities and modifications. The Jaina theory of reality does not leave room for both an absolute permenides and an eternal flux of Heraclitus.¹ It accepts only the dynamic reality which has the three fundamental characteristics, viz. Utpida (origin), vyava (destruction), and dhrauvya (Permanence).² 

Dravya is also the substratum of gunas (qualities) and paryayas (modes)³. There is neither quality without substance nor subhstance without quality.⁴ Dravya is one as a class, and is the inherent essence of all things manifesting diverse forms,⁵ In its reality it can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through its modes it secures the triple nature in character.⁶ Dravya is of six kinds, namely, Jiva (soul), pudgala (matter), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), Akasa (space) and Kala (time) The first five types of dravyas are called astikayas (those which exist and have different pradesas or areas like a body) and the last is named anastikaya.⁷

According to another classification it is of three kinds, viz. sakriya (active), niskriya (inactive), and sakriyaaniskriya (active-inactive). The sakriya dravyas, which have the capacity of moving from place to place, are pudgala and jiva. The niskriya dravya is against the narture of sakriya dravya. It has neither direct nor indirect functional power. Space comes under this classification. Kala is also included in the category of Niskriya dravyas, though it accounts for changes in other things. Sakriya niskrla dravyas are those realities which move about without themselves undergoing changes or motion. These have merely avagahana (place). The dharma and adharma dravya come under this classification. Jiva, dharma, and adharma have innumerable areas or pradesas,akasa has infinite pradesas, and pudgala is of numerable pradesas. Kala has one pradesa.⁹ These six dravyas maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, though they are nutually interpenetrating and accommodate one another and mix up to occupy the same space.⁹ Akasa, Kala, Jiva, dharma and adharma are formless or amurta drvyas. They do not possess the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound and colour. Pudgala (matter) alone is murta. All the dravyas, except Jiva, are acetana (devoid of consciousness).¹⁰

In another classification, the dravyas or Tattvas are divided into seven categories, viz. Jiva (soul), ajiva (nonsoul), asrava (inflow of karmic matter into the sould), bandha (bondage of soul by karmic matter), sanbara (stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter), nirjara (shedding of karmic matter), and moksa (liberation of sould from karmic matter). The seven tattvasare so arranged here as to provide an epitome of the Jaina doctrine of salvation. The plight of the Jiva in somsara and mirjara are two states in the process of liberation wherein the inflow of karmic matter is first stopped and all karmic matter is subsequently shed. The jivd thus becomes completely free of karmic matter and attains moksa. These seven tattvas are eternal and `'sat".¹¹

(i) Jiva (soul)

The Jaina theory of soul, though fundamentally similar to the concept of soul in othe philosophical schools, is still differrent from them in certain respects. Soul is eternal, uncreated and beginningless. There is no controversy on this point. The controversial point is its nature. The Samhitas of the Rigveda¹² and Atharvaveda¹³ state about the nature of the soul that when a man dies, it goes to the world of his forefathers and stays with ceaseless perfect life. The Sataptha Brahmana¹⁴ points out that it is enjoyer of good or evil deeds. The Upanisads are against its plural form¹⁵. According to the Kathopanisad¹⁶, it is eternal and distinct from body. Avidya is the cause of wandering into birth.¹⁷ Further, Gaudapada says that it is one and neither born nor created. Maya (illusion) is the casue of appearance of births. Ssnkara follows Gaudapada's view, saying "It is due to maya, pure and simple, that the Great Self (Atman) appears as the threefold states (viz. walking, dreaming the dreamless sleep) even as a rope appears as a snake and the like."¹⁸

Both the Sankhya and the Yoga systems are practically one.¹⁹ Sankhya presents the doctrfues while the Yoga prescribes certain practices for the sake of their spiritual development'. The sould in these philosophies is accepted in the form of purusa, but it is said to be absolutely non-active or unattached to prakrti or matter and Purusa is unaffected by the vicissitudes of the Prakrti²⁰.

According to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika philosophy, the soul itself is responsible for its deeds. Its is eternal and possesses the non-eternal qualities such as consciousness, desire etc. Jnana (knowledge) is distinct from soul and it obtains the capacity of knowing by association with itself. That means Juana is devoid of knowing power by nature²¹.

The Buddha, on the other hand, declined to answer the nature of sould as he felt that it is not indispensible for the removal of suffering. The entire universe in his view is a bundle of Khandhaas, viz. rupa (body), vedana (feeling) sanna (perception), sankhara (aggregates), and vinnana (consciousness). All things including even soul are analysed into the elements that can be perceived in them. All things are devoid of soul, just as a chariot is nothing but a congregation of wheel, frame, etc. "I" or "Mine" should not be attached with mundane affaris if one wants to attain salvation. Hence this view is named anatta in Buddism.²²

Jainism considers soul as the central figure. Its perfect knowledge (Bhedajnana or Atmajnana) is essential to destroy karmsa and attain salvation.²³ The nature of soul in Jainism is to be understood from the standpoint of non-absolutism (anekantavada). From the real standpoint (niscayanaya), soul is absolutely pure possessing the nature of knowledge and vision (ahameko khalu siddho damsanamiya sadrupi)²⁴. It is regarded to be without smell, without sound, not an object of anumand (inference), without any definite bodily shape, imperceptible and intangible and is characterised by consciousness²⁵. Acarya Nemicandra points out that the soul is characterised by upayoga (consciousness), is formless (amutti), is an agent (katta), has the same extent as its own body (sadehaparimana), is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma (bhotta), exists in world (samsarattho), is siddha (siddho) and has the characteristic upward motion (vissasoddhagai):

Jivo ubao gamao amutti katta sadehaparimano.

Bhotta samsarattho siddho so vissasoddhagai²⁶

Thus we have seen that the nature of soul in Jainism is dual in character. According to the realistic standpoint, it remains the same unhder all states, while accroding to the practical standpoint, it is transformed into modes and thus becomes different in number, place, form, etc.

(ii) Pudgala (matter)

Things perceived or enjoyed by the senses, bodies, mind, karma, and the other material objects are called Pudgala (matter)²⁷. They can be touched tasted, smelt, and have colour. Sabda (sound produced by various means). Bandha (union caused by man or otherwise), sauksmya (fineness), shaulya (grossness) samsthana (figure), bheda (dividion), tamas (darkness), chaya (shade) and atapa (sun-shine) are the forms of Pudgala. it has two prominent forms, namely atoms (anu) and molecule (skandhas)²⁸. They unite together to construct reality.

The nature of the universe in Jainism is based on the nature of reality which possess triple characteristics, utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. The things that exist cannot be destroyed and the things that do not exist cannot be originated from a realistic standpoint, but they get transformed into their own attributes and modes from a practical point of view.²⁹ This system of realities results in the universe being in finite as well as eternal in character. The entire universe, according to Jainism, is a compendium of the six Dravyas which are a permutation and combination of atoms. The atom in Jainology is the smallest unitary part of pudgala. It is characterised by its internal cohesion (sneha) and indivisible unity. a molecule (anu), a kombination of atoms, results in an aggregate of matter (skandha)³⁰. Anui is an indivisible entity and cannot be perceived by ordinary men.

Pudgaladravya is always transformed into skandha and paramanu. The upadana karana (substantive cause) and the nimitta karana (external cause) are responsible for these modifications. For instance, in the manufacturing of apot, clay is the substantive cause and the potter, stick, water, etc. are external causes. Each and every entity runs through these two causes and gets its similar modes.

Thus the univers in Jaina philosophy is undivided, uncreated, eternal, self-existent, and infinite from realistic standpoint; while from a practical standpoint of its inter-related parts it is transitory, phenomenal, evanescent, and finite. This theory rejects all the other theories based on the absolute standpoint such as Kalavada, Svabhavavada, Niyativada, Yadrechavada, Purusavada, Isvarvada, Bhutavada, etc.

The doctrine of karman seems to have developed against these doctrines of creation. According to Janiism, the vibrations (yoga) and the passions (ksayas) of soul attract karmic matter and transform it into karmic body. Soul is pure in its intrinsic nature. The relation of karmas is a cause that makes its cycling into births. This is the nature of bondage. Soul, which is amurtd (spiritual), is affected by karmas which are murta (material). This concrete association of the spiritual and the meterial leads to the existence of universe, which is beginningless. The material karman (dravyakarman) is a avarana (cover) which brings about the bhavakarman (its spirtinal counterpart) that is called dosa like privation and perversion. This is the mutual relation as cause and effect of both these karmas.

Karmas are classified into eight main types, viz. (1) Jnanavarana (knowledge-obscuring). (2) Darsanbavarana (vision-obscuring). (3) Vedaniya (feeling-producing). (4) Mohaniya (deluding). (5) Ayu (longevity determining). (6) Nama (body-making). (7) Gotra (status determining, and (8) Antaraya (obstructive).

These karmas are sub-divided into one hundred and forty eight which may be seen in detail in Gomattasara Karmakanda etc.

The inflow of karmic matter into the soul is called Asrava and the bondage of the soul by karmic matter is called Bandha in Jainism. Both are related mutually to each other as cause and effect. Asrava isthe antecedent and anterior cause of bondage. The stoppage of inflow of karmic matters into the soul is called Samvara and the shedding of karmic matters by the soul is cailed Nirjara. Evil thoughts and miseries lead to a suffering in the world as well as in hell. The happiness of salvation.³¹

Thus the Samvara and Nirjara lead to the destruction of the karmas and reveal the purity of self, which is called Moksa Umasvami says that Moksa is a state of freedom from all karmic matter owing to the destruction of the cause of bondage and to the shedding of the karmas³². Pujyapada in the Sarvarthasiddhi defines moksa "as the state of the highest condition of purification, unthinkable inherent attitude of knowledge and unobstructed bliss, of a soul which becomes totally free from the defect of karmic dirt and is liberated from the body³³.

(3-4) Dharma and Adharma

Dharma and adharma dravyas convey special meanings ih Jainism. Dharma is accepted as a kind of Ether which helps us in motion. Pudgala and Jiua move with the help of dharma as fish move with the help of water. Adharma is the exact opposite of dharma. It assists Pudgalas and Jiuas in staying as a shadow assists travellers to rest ³⁴.

(5) Akasa Dravya:

Akasa in Jainism provides a place for all substances to exact. It is said to be anantapradesi (possessing infinite pradesas) amurtika (having a non-physical factor), and niskriya (inactive), and savayaui (having parts). It is of two kinds, lokakasa and alokakasa. The former is co-extensive with the dravyas, whereas the latter is devoid of this characheristic. Loke consists of three divisions, Uadholoka (upper world),Madhyalok  (middle world_, and Adholoka (lower world). They are the abodes of celestial beings, men and other creatures, and the inmates of hell. Beyond this Likakasa which is said to be eternal, infinite, formless, without activity and perceptible only by the omnisscient ³⁵

(6) Kala dravaya

Kala in Jainism is divided into two categories, ByauaharaKala and Paramarthikakala. The former helps to change substances into their modes and the latter is undersrood from continuity. Time is not an appearance but a reality since we experience it in the form of hours, minutes etc. ³⁶

The Six Dravyas in Buddhist Literature

The references fo six dravyas of Jainism are found in the pali Canon as well as in later Sanskrit Buddhist literature. They aer however, not referred to in a systematic order,.

(1) The Jaina Conception of Soul (Jiva).

In the course of a conversation with Sakya Mahanama, the Buddha speaks of Nigantha Nataputta's doctrine as follows:

"If there is an evil deed that was formerly done by you, ger rid of its consequences by severe austerity, To keep away from of body ( kayena samvuta), control of soeech (vacaya samvuta), and control of thought(manasassanvuta).Thus by burning up, by making an end of former deeds, by the nondoing of new deeds, there is no transmission of modes in the future for him. Form there being no transmission in future is the destruction of deeds (ayatim anavassavo), from the destruction of deeds is the destruction of ill, from the destruction of ill is the destruction of feeling, from the destruction of feeling all ill become worn away." The Buddha says further, "That is approved by us; it is pleasing to us: therefore we are delighted³⁷."

This is a comprehensive introduction to the seven states or Tattvas of the Jainas. The thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta represented in this passage are as follws:

(i) The existence of Soul.

(ii) Sukha of Duhkha is due to previous karmas done.

(iii) By ascetic practices with right knowledge on could get rid of the effects of karmic matter.

(iv) On the complete stoppage of karmic matter,Dukkhas would be arrested, and without dukkha there would be no Vedana (feeling).and the absence of Vedana leads to the end of dukkhas and this is called moksa. Here the first point represents Jive and ajiva, the second represents the asrave and the bandha, and the third point stands for samvara and nirjara, and the last corresponds to Moksa.

The Brahmajalasutta in the Dighanikaya refers to the sixty-two contemporary philosophical views which fall into two categoris namely Pubantanuditthi indicating the ultinate beginningless of things concerned with the ultinate passt on eighteen grounds, and the aparantanuditthi concerned with the future on forty-four grounds. All the current views of that tine have been classified into these two groups, as the Buddha himself says that there is no other conception beyond them (natthi ito bahiddha).³⁸

According to pubbantanuditthis, theviews about the be ginning of things in eighteen ways are as follows ³⁹:

(i) Some (sassatatvadis) hold in four ways that the soul (atta) and the universe (loka are eternal,

(ii) Some (Ekaccasassatavadis) hold in four ways that the soul and universe are in sone resoects eternal and in sone not.

(iii) Some (antanantavadis) hold that the universe is finite or infinite or finite and infinite, or neither finite nor infinite.

(iv) Some (anaravikkhepavadis) wriggle like eels in four ways and refuse a clear answer.

(v) Some (adhiccasamuppannavadis) assert in two ways that the soul and the universe have arisen without a cause.

In the context of showing the aparantanuditthis⁴⁰ (views abowt the future), the Buddha mentions then in forty-four ways:

(i) Some (Uddhamafhatanika asnnivadis) hold in sixteen ways that the soul is conscious after death.

(ii) Some (Uddhamaghatamika asannivadis) hold in eight ways the it is unconscious after death.

(iii) Some (Uddhamaghatanika nevasnni-nasannivadis) hold in eight ways that it is neither conscious nor unconscious after death.

(iv) Some (Ucchedavadis) hold in seven ways the annihilation of the soul.

(v) Some (ditthadhammanibbanvadis) hold that nibbana consists in the enjoument of this life in five ways, either in the pleasures of sense or one of the four trances.

out of these conceptions, the theories of Uddhamaghata nika sannivada should be mentioned here, according to which the soul is conscious and eternal. The Buddha says: "Thete ate brethern, recluses and Brahmanas who maintin in sixteen ways, that the soul after death is conscious and it is not a subject to decay. "The sixteen ways are as follows⁴¹:

(i) Soul has form (rupi atta hoti arogo param marana sanni)-

(ii)soul is formless (arupi atta hoti arogo param marana)

(iii) Soul has and has not form (rupi ca arupi atta hoti).

(iv) neither has nor has not form (nevarapi narupi atta hoti).

(v) is finite (antava atta hoti)

(vi) is infinite (anantava atta hoti).

(vii) is both (antava ca anantava ca atta holi).

(viii) is neither (nevantava nanantava ca atta holi).

(ix) has one mode of consciousness (ekattasanniatta hoti).

(x) has various motes of consciousness (nan ittasanni atta hoti).

(xi) has limited consciousness (parittasanni atta hoti).

(xii) has infinite consciousness (appamanasanni atta hoti).

(xiii) is altogether happy (ekantasukhi atta hoti).

(xiv) is altogether miserable (elamtadilljo atta hoti).

(xv) is both (sukhadukkhi atta hoti).

(xvi) is neither (adukkhamasukhi atta hoti).

A list of sixteen theories regarding the nature of soul is also referred to in the Udana⁴². The topics listed there are said to be debated by many Sananas and Brahmanas,and they are the same type of conception of the soul as we find in the section of Uddhamaghatanika sannivada. Thesame points ate also treated somewjtat dofferemt;u in the list of undeternined questions⁴³. There several other places also in pali literature where such questions had been discussed44.

Out of these views mentioned above, the thoughts of Nigantha Nataputta can be detected. As we have already seen Buddhaghosa thought that Jainism was a combination of eternalism and nihilism. If this is due to an early Buddhist tradition, the Nigantha Nataputta's views might have been recorded in Pali Literature under these two sections. The sassatavada indicatesthe eternality of soul which should have been mentioned fron the realistic standpoint and Ucchedavada points out the non-eternality of soul which should have been explained from practical standpoint. That means soul is eternal and having consciousness according to mscayanaya, and it is non eternal and is a subhect to change in its modifications from the viewpoint of vyavaharanaya. Itis also pointed out that soyl is extended over all parts of bidy which is very similar to the view of Jainas. Jainism is also of view that soul is formless and is possessed of consciousness⁴⁵. Buddhaghosa also referred to this view of Jainas⁴⁶.

Potthapada⁴⁷ Describes the theories of atta (soul) as follows:

(i) Atta has a a forn and is composed of the four elements enjoying food. Thes is the theory of material soul (O arikam kho, aham bhante, attanam paccemi rupim catumahabhutikam kabalikaraharabhakkham ti).

(ii) Atta is made of mind (nanonaya) comprising of all parts and not devoid of sense-organs (manonayan kho aham bhante attanam paccemi sabbangapaccangim ahimndriyam ti).

(iii) Atta is formless and with consciousness (arupim kho aham, bhante, attanam paceemi sannamayam ti).

(iv) Consciousness is different from Atta (anna va sanna anna va atta ti).

Out of these theories, Guruge is of view thet the first theory probably belonge to the Jainas, for Jainism flourished in the sane region where the Buddha was active⁴⁸. As a matter of fact, this theory belongs to the Carvaka philosophy accrding to which soyl, like body, is a congregation of the four elements⁴⁹. Nosuch view is accepted by jaina philosophy. The third wiew can be, of course, recognised as the Jaina theory of soyl, for soul in Jainism is accepted, as we have already seen, formless and conscious.

Vasubandhu mentions that according to the Jainas,the soul is eternal by nature. and it makes extension according to the body50.

The Catuhsataka also pointed out that according to sone philosophers the soul is spread over the entire body. It shringks and extends according to the dimensions of the body of man or aninal. Therefore,a bee, bird, elephant, etc, have their souls in proportion to their bodies⁵¹. This view mentioned in the Catuhsataka is definirely related to the Jaina theory of soul. Umasvati says that by the contraction and ezpansion of the pradesas, the soul expands according to the body, as the light from a lamp gets expansion and contraction according to the room. That is the reason why a soyl can occpy the space represented by an ant or an elephaht52.

Acarya Santaraksita in his Tattvasangraha wrote a separate chaoter entitled Atma pariksa or the examination of Soul.He there refuted most of the relevant theories. In this context he established the theory of soul according to the Jainas and then refuted it on the basis of the doctrine of momentariness of Buddhism.

The theory of soyl] according to the Jainas' as he describad, has been established throwgh Dravyarthikanaya (successive factors point of view) and paryayarthikanaya (successive factors point of view). He says: the soyl has the charcteristic of consciousness only (cillaksana evatma).In the form of substance,it remains the same under all states (anugatatnaka or comprehensive) by nature, while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is exclusive in its nature (vyavrtyatmaka).This two-fold character of soul is cognised by direct perceprion, and does not stand in need of being proved by other evidence. thus consciousness which continues to exist through all states, even though these states are diverse, is a form of pleasure and rest, from the substance standpoint, while the successive factors consist of the diverse states which appearone after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived⁵³.

Santaraksita further explains the above view of Jainas stating of behalf of them that of the substance wete absolutely different from the successive factors, then no difference in it would be possible; because on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one. As a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regatds number is that the substance is one, while the successive factors are many. By nature, one is comprehensive, while the other is distributive. In number, a jar, for example, is one while its colour and the rest are many. In this way. their functions, etc, are also different, Thus substance is not absolutely different from the successive factors. Therefore, soul and its modes are also not absolutely different. Having the characteristic of consciousness, it is eternal and constant fron the view of substance, wtile from the view of successive factors it changes in its modes such as pleasure, pain, etc54.

The Jainas try to convince the opponents by presenting the example of Narasimha, there is no self-contradiction in the dual characteristic of soul. For,the soul is impartiate (nirbhaga); therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately⁵⁵.

The theory of soul in Jainism, as referred to by Santaraksita, is also raferred to by Arcata in his Hetubindutika56. The arguments submitted to refute the theory also are similar. The main defect, according to them, in this theory, is the selfcontradiction, which is not accepted by the Jainas, Santaraksita urged that one entity cannot bave two forms. Ke puts forward two points in support of his view.He says if there is an wumodified substance in connection with successive factors,there is on difference in it, and in that case, it is not liable to be modified⁵⁷. Oneness between substance and its modes will involve the substance to be distribured like the forms of successive factors or the successive factors themselves would be mixed into the substance. Hence there would be no difference between them and the theory will be disproved⁵⁸.As regards Narasimha.he says. it is an aggregate of many atoms, that is whyot seems dual in nature (anekanusanuhatma sa tathaiva pratiyate)59. ThuSantaraksita, as well as Arcata⁶⁰, refutes the theory on the ground that one. cannot bave two forms. Otherwise the eternality and the dual nature would be both untrue and unreliable.

As a matter pf factthe dual characteristic, of soul is based on the standpoint of non-absolutism which is ignored by the Buddhist philosophers. The view of Jainas against these objections will be discussed in the chapter on Syadvada. Moreover, we can point ont here that there is no selg-contradiction problem through Non-absolutistic standpoint.

(2) Ajive or Pudgala (matter): Nature of Karmas

The mundane soul attract the karmas and then they stand towards each other in relationship of phenonenal conjunction. Therelation, according to Jainism, is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation. Soul and Karmas can be dissociated as they ate two separate entities.

Pali Literature cantains some valuable references to the jaina doctrine of Karma. Triyoga is themost significant aspect of Jaina ethics in that it explains the origin of karmas and their attachment to the soul through the three means of word, deed, and theought.This is also called the tridanda Karma61. The Buddha also recognises the tridanda Karma but in a spme&wtjat dofferent way. It is well known fow the Buddha generally gave new meanings to old philosophical and ethical terms and taught new doctrines based on them. The famous triyoga ortridanda doctrine was originally a Jaina dogma. The Buddha himself has ascribed it ro Nigantha Nataputta before refuting it. He asks a Nigantha named Dighatapassi in Nalanda as how many kinds of wrong doing bring about about evil effects according to the teaching of Nigantha Nataputta? Dighatapassi in Nalanda as how many kinds of wrong doings bring about evil effects according to the teaching of Nigantha Nataputta/ Dighatapassi replied that the Kayadanda is most heinous 62

Here, danda means duccarita or wrong behaviour in body, speech and thought, which brongs nmisery and distress to the muldane soul. The Buddha recognised kayakanmma, Vacikamma and Manokamma in place of kayadanda, vacidanda andmanodanda. The Dispute between the Buddha and the Jainas on the use of Kamma and Danda is apparently due to the distinct connotation the term Karma has to each system. To the Buddhist it signifies volitional action while to the Jaina it is the endproduct of action which clings on to the soul in a material form. Both Danda and Kamma bave the same meaning in Jainism. The use of the word Danda in the sense of Kamma can be seen in the Thanange (3. 126)

The more important difference of opinion between the Buddha and Nigantha Nataputta relates to the relative ethical sigmificance of deed, word or thought? The Buddha says that the nost heinous is thought (manoodanda) while Nigantha Nataputta is said to have held deed (kayadanda) to be the worst.

The reference in Upali Sutta of the Manodanda. Nikaya to the disput gives the impression that the Niganthas did not realise the inportance of the mind or manodanda. It is reslly not so and it needs further clarification. Nigantha Nataputta did not, at any stage, envisage dodily action which is devid of intention and volition.Involuntary acts-such as miatakes and accidents do not fall within the purview of Kayadanda. Only such action as is preceded by thought is Kayadanda and the true significance of Nigantha Nataputta's attitude to three-fold action can be conveyed when kayadanda is translated and understood not as mere bodily action but as "thought converted into action."

Acarya Kundakunda condemned asceticism, if it is unaccompanied by intention (bhava). The guilt or otherwise of an action depends on the nature and intensity of thougth and intention. If one is ever thinking of causing harm to another, he is guilty of malicious thought even though he does not actually cause any injury, while another, who, with no intention of causing any injury, becomes unconsciously the instrument of injury, should not be morally held responsible for that act. For instance, a burglar who fails in robbing after attemping to do so, is to be punished as a felon; and a surgeon, even though his patient may die during an operation skillfully performed with all attention, is not held responsible for such a deat⁶³. Butif any wrong is intentionally committed, he is, of course, more responsible and blamable for such "wrong" than he who merely harbours malicious thought but does not actually cause any injury:

Avidhayapi hi himsa himsaphalabhajanam bhavatyekah.

Krtva' pyaparo himsa himsa himsaphalabhajanam na ayat⁶⁴.

Thus in Jainism the Kayadanda is worse than either Manodanda or Vacidanda. The Buddha indicated the same idea but defined its characteristics in a different manner. This is one area where the two do not really disagree, Jainism, like Buddhism, is a religion that gives inportance to intention before an ethical judgement is made of any action.

Another reference in thes connection is found in the Anguttara Nikaya where Nigantha Nataputta is designated Kriyavadi (activist),while the Buddha is said to be both kriyavadi and akriyavadi. An episode relates fow siha, the General of Licchavis, asked for permission to meet the Buddha, and how Nigantha Nataputta did not allow him to do so saying that the Buddha taught the akriyavada. However, Siha decided to meer the Buddha and verified at once whether he is akriyavadi. In response to this question the Buddha said that he is both Kriyavadi and akriyavadi. He is akriyavadi in the sense that he taught beings how to abstain from evil actions, and he is kriyavadi in the sense that he taught them how to perform good deeds. The Buddha's reply is as follows:-

"There is a way in which one might say of me that the ascetic Gotama bolds the principle of non-action, teaches the doctrine of non-action, and by this leads his disciples; and there is a way in which one might rightly say of me that the ascetic Gotama folds the principle of action? I proclaim the non-doing of various kinds of wickes and evil things. And how might one say of me that the ascetic Gotama folds the principle of action? I proclaim the doing of good conduct of body. speech. and thought. I proclaim the doing of various kinds of good thingas ⁶⁵".

The question arises here as to why Nigantha Nataputta criticised the Buddha as an Akriyavadi? And why the buddha gave an answer like this/ the Satrakrtanga includes Buddhists among the Akriyavadins, since they do not accept the existence of soul and hence deny karman as well⁶⁶. Further it describes the types of Akriyavada as follows⁶⁷.

(i) On the dissolution of the five elements, i.e. earth, water, fire, wind, air, living beings cease to exist. On the dissolution fo body the individual ceases to be. Everybody has an individual soul. The soul exists as long as the body exists.

(ii) When a man acts or causes another to act. it is not his soul, which acts or causes to act (Sukr.i.1.1.33).

(iii) There are five elements and the soul is a sixth substance. These six substances are imperishable.

(iv) Pleasure, pain, and final beatitude are not caused by the souls thenselves, but the individual souls experience them.

(v) The world has been created or is governed by the gods. It is produced from chaos. (SuKr. 1.13.5.8).

(vi) The world is boundless and eternal.

All these views ate reduced to four main types that correspond to those associated in the Pali Nikayas with four leading thinkers of the tine, e.g. atheism like that of Ajita. etermalism like that of Katyayana, absolutism like that of Kasyapa and fatalism like that of Gosala.

The types of Kriyavada that do not come up to the standard of Jainism are the following:

(i) The soul of a man who is pure will become free from bed karma on reaching beatitude but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement ot hatred.

(ii) if a man with the intention of killing a body hurts a gourd mistaking it for a baby, hf will be guilty of murder

But this definition of Satrakrianga is also not altogether an adequate summary of the doctrine of Kriyavada and Akriyqvada, In another place the same work presents the characteristics in a better way. It says: the Kriyavada teaches that the soul exists, acts, and is affected by acts, and this held by the Jainas fn common with the Vaisesikas and Nyaya schools. The akriyavada means a doctrine, according to which the soul dose not act or is not effected by acts. It is held, according to the Jaina view, by the Buddhists in common with the vedanta, Sankhya and Yoga schools⁶⁸. It is,therefore, in the light of the negation of a soul by the Buddha that Nigantha Nataputta called him an Akriyavadin.

Silanka appears to hold that the Buddhists fall into the akriyavada category, for they denied the existence of a soul. But, as a matter of fact, the mere denial of the existence of a soul does not nean that Buddhism should be included into akriyavada. The Buddha believes fully in moral responsibilities and the ethical consequences of both good and bad acts, words, and thoughts. He fully accepted the doctrine of karma which governs the cycles of rebirth. Apparently the Jainas wete not fully aware of these facts of Buddhist ethics. But it is somewthat surprising as the contemporary philosopherly the teachings of Makkhali gosala, a contemporary nohilist, on the ground of akriyavada.

Another reference to the karma doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta is found in the Majjhima Nikaya. According to that the inflow of karmas can be stopped by performing severe penance with right knowledge⁶⁹. The familiarity with the karma theory of Jainas can also be traced in the Mahabodhi Jataka⁷⁰. It is said there that once the Bodhisattve was born in the family of a Brahmana. When he came of age, he renounced the world and became a mendicant and lived at the Himalayas. During the rainy season he caoe down and going on his begging rounds he gradually appproached Benares. there he took up his abode in the royal park, and on the followinbg day he got his meal from the king. Afterwards, the king had a hut of leaves built for him and used to come to pay his respect to the mendicant daily thrice a day. And so twelve years passed.

Now the king had five counsellors who advised him on temporal and spiritual matters. One of then denied the existence of cause (karma). Another believed everything was the act of a Supreme Being. A third professed the doctrine of previous actions.A fourth believed in annihilation at death. Afifth held the Ksatriya doctrine. He who denied the cause taughe the people that existence in this world was purified by rebirte. He who believed in the action of Supreme Being tatght that the world was created by hi,. He who belieced in the consequences of previous acts tayght that sorrfow or joy that befalls man here is the result of some previous action. The beliver in annihilation taught no one passed hence to another world, but that this world is annihilated. He who professed the ksatriya creed taught that one's own interest is to be desired even at the cost of killing one's parents. These men were appointed to sit in judgement in the king's court and being greedy of bribes they dispossessed the rightful owner of property.

out o these, the third counsellor seems to bave represented the thoughts of Migantha Nataputta who preached that all things happenen in life are due to the previous karmas. Such previous karmic matter, though present, begin to operate only when they become mature and then they produce corresponding psychic states through which they bind the self⁷¹.

The Bodhisattva of the Mahabodhi Jataka criticised this theory theory along with other theories belonging to the five counsellors of the king. It is said there that while he accepted the offer of the king to be judge of his court, he became very popular withim a short perid. The five coumsellors got angry with him and tried to convince the king that the Bodhisattve was seeking sovereingty, Hence the king diminished the fonours paid to him and made plans to slay him. The Bodhisattva come to know all these things and went again towards the kimalaya.

The five counsellors in order to prevent him from coming again in the city publicised that the Bodhisattva with the help of the queen wanted to slay the king. As a result, the queen was put to death. Hence the sons became enemies of th king. In the meantine the Bodhisattva came to know this conspiracy and came to the city to save the life of the king. He entered a frontier village and after eating the flesh of a monkey given to him by the inhabitants he begged for its skin. Which he had dried in his hermit's hut. He went then to the city of Benares and had himself seated in the park on the without any response the Bodhisattva began to rub the monkey's skin. The king asked why he was doing so? The codhisattva replied that the monkey was very useful to me but I ate its flesh. The counsellors thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of a monkey. The Boddshisattva, adderssing one by one, denied their charge and criticised therir theories.

The third counsellor's thought that this man is guilty of taking the life of a monkey. The Boddhisattva, addressing one by one, denied their chatge and criticised theories.

The third counsellor's theory which is supposes to have represnted Jainism is criticised as follown:

From former action still both bliss and woe again:

This monkey pays his debt, to wit, tis former sin:

Each act a debt discharged, where then does guilt come in?

If such the creed thou holdst and this be doctrine true,

Then was my action right when I that monkey slew.

couldst thou but only see him sinful is thy creed.

Thou wouldst no longer then with reason blame my deed⁷².

The majjhima Nikaya⁷³ also supports the jaina theory of Karmas. According to the Jaina Agamas, Soul enjoys all sorts of fruits of Karmas done ⁷⁴. As regards the criticism of this theory made by the Buddha, it does not provide any substantial argument. moreover the Mahabodhi jataka is a later development.of the Jataka literature. Ailanka refets to only 500 Jataka stories belonging to the Jatakas ⁷⁵. which shows its nature of development.

In the Anguttara Nikaya76 the same idea is found in traditional doctrional doctrines of inaction (tinimam bhikkhave titthayatanam yani panditehi samanuyunjiyamanam akiriyaya Aanthahanti) They ate as follows:-

(i) There are certain recluses and the Brahmanas who hold the view that "whatever happiness or misery or neutrel feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action (yain kim cayajm purisapuggalo patisanvedeti sukham ya dukkham ua adukkhamasukham va sabbm tam pubbekatahetu ti)

(ii) All the pleasure and misery ate due to a Supreme Deity (issaranimmanahetu).

(iii) Others teach that all such pleasure and misery are uncaused and unconditioned (ahetu appaccaya).

Out of these three theories the first is undoubtedly related to the doctrine of Nigantha Nataputta. Criticising this view, the Buddha pointed out that owing to previous actions, men will become murderers, stealers, unchaste, liars, etc, For those who fall back on oast deeds as the essential cause of present action, there is neither desire to do, nor effort to do, nor would they consider it to do this deed or abstain from that deeed. The necessity ofr action of inaction not being foune to exist in truth, the term Samana cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves, since you live in a state of bewildering with faculties unwarded⁷⁷.

Here the argument raised by the Buddha against the first theory is that if all is due to the preevious karmas, then it is not essential to make effort to abstain from them. This conception might have been known to Nigantha Nataputta when he accused the BuddHA as an Akriyavadi (Non-actionist).Acarya Kundakunda=⁷⁸ is of opinion that all the previously bound karmic matters operate onle when they become mature. The Nigantha Nataputta prescribed severe penance with perfect knowledge to destroy the karmas. The Buddha himself, as we have already seen, expresses his satisfaction with regard to the theory⁷⁹.

The Anguttara Nikaya80 Describes the sixbreeds (chalahbhijali) as the different categories of beings,as declared by Puran Kassapa. They are,

(i) Black breed (kanhabhijati pannatta) category includes the mutton-butchers, Jailers, etc.

(ii) blue breed (nilabhijati pannatta) includes the monks who live as though with a thorn in the side and all others who profess the deed and doing so (bhikkhu kantakavittika ye va pana anepi keci kammavada kiriyavada)

(iii) the third is the red breed (lohitabhijati pannatta) the category to which Niganthas belong;

(iv) the fourth is yellow breed (haliddabhijati) which includes the white-robed householders and followers of the Ajivikas;

(v) the fifth is the white breed (sukkabhijati) which includes the Ajivikas.

(iv) the last is the purest white (paramasukkabhijati) in which Purana kassapa is included.

The Buddha hears of this division from Ananda to whom later on he declares the six breeds according to his own conception. Thews six divisions are mainly divided into two divisions, black and white. This division is based on the good and bad karmas of man. The Jainas also have about the same division into six categories, but they are not mentioned in Pali literatute. The Jainas have the particular word Lesya for such division

The Lesyas are different stages of soul influenced by different karmas and activities of mind. They are classified into six naing types, viz. krsna (black), nila (blue), kapota(grey), pita(yellow), padma (pink) and sykla81 (white).These are nothing but the states of beings based on their activities of mind. The krsna is the worst lesya of the first three and the pita is the least puer of the latter three lesyas. According to another division, these six divisions are classified into two divisions, dravyalesya and dhavalesya. This is similar to the classification made by the Buddha and the Yogasastra. ⁸² Since the conception of lesyas is not mentioned in the Pali Canon, we can say that it may have originated later in Jainology as sn imitation of ^Sramana traditions.

The Anguttara Nikaya 83 describes three kinds of yoga (manasa, vacana and kaya) which cause the karmic matter into the soul due to ignorance (avijja). It is said there that at Kapilavatthu, Vappa⁸⁴ a follower of Nigantha Nataputta went to visit Moggalayana. Moggalayana asked Vappa "There is some one here, Vappa, restrained in body, speech and thought owing to the waning of ignorance and the arising of knowledge (kayena, samvuto, vacaya samvuto, manasa samvuto avijjaviraga vijjuppada). He then asked Vappa whether he perceives any cause owing to which the asavas causing pain would flow upon the man at some future time. (passasino tuam vappa, tam thanam yato mdanam purisam dukkavedaniya asava assaveyyun abhisamparayam 'ti) Vappa then replied "sir, I do see such reason. There may be in this casa a certain evil deed whose fruit has not yet ripened. owing to the ^asavas causing pain might flow in wpon that man at some future time  

^{passamaham bhante, tam thanam idhassu bhante pubbepapakammam katam avipakkavipakam tato nidanam purisam dukkhavedaniya asava assaveyyum abhisamparayam}). 

At this juncture, the Buddha came there and having a conversation he asked vappa "As to these asavas which come about as a result of bodily activities, in the case of one who sustains from bodily activities that causes vexation and distress, it follows that thoes asavas causing pain do not exist in him.He does not do fresh deeds. as to tis former deed; he wears it out of constant contact with is, by a wearing out that is plain to see,not just for a time, one that asks for inspection that leads onward a wearing out that can be understood by the intelligent each for himselg. The same is repeated in the context of^{vacisamarambhhapaccaaaya and manosamarambhapaccaya}. The Buddha repeated thrice this question. Upali answered it in the words "that cannot be". Further, the Buddha explained his views. He said: "Vappa, by the monk, whose heart is perfectly released, six constant abiding&states (satatavihara) are attained. He, seeing an object with the eye, is neither elated nor depressed, but rests indifferent, mindful and comprehending. Hearing a sound with the ear...smelling a scent with the nose...tasting a savout with the tongue...with body contacting tangibles..with mind cogizing mental states he is neither elated not depressed, but rests in different, mindful and comprehending. When he feels a feeling limited by body, he knows that he so feels. He knows: when body breaks up, after life is used up, all my experiences in this world will lose their lure and grow cold. Suppose, Vappa, that shadow is cast by a stump. Then comes a man with axe and basket and cuts down that stump by the root, so doing he digs all round it, Having done so he pulls up the roots, even the rootlets and root-fibres. He chops that stump into logs and having done so chops the og ingo chips. The chips he dries in wind and sun, then burns them with fire, then makes an ash-heep. The ash-heap he winnows in a strong wind or lets the ash be carried away by a swifty flowing river. Verily, Vappa, that shadow cast because of the stump,made not to become again, of a nature not to arise againg in future time. Just in the same way, Vappa, by a monk , whose heart is the released, six nonstant abiding-places are won.He seeing an object with the eye...with mind cognizing mental states, is neither elated nor depressed, but abides indifferednt, mindful and comprehending, when he feels a feeling limited by body...limited by lite, he knows that be so feels. He kmows: When body breaks up, after lite is used up,all my experiences in this world will lose their luer and grow old. "⁸⁵

There is no substantial argument, in favt, in this criticism by the Buddha. Yoga attracts the karmic matter towards the soul and connects the same with it. The soul is obscured by such karmic matter since time immemorial. That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. That is the reason why it experiences fruits, good or bad. The destruchion of Karmas, according to Jainism, depends on the restraint of mind, word, any body. By severe penance one can destroy all the past deeds and prevent the flow of new karmas. ⁸⁶ 

The ^{Anguttara Nikaya 87} refers to the five ways of falling into sin, according to Nigantha Nataputta. They are destruction of animates (^panatipata), takiong what is not given (adinnadayi..), passion enjoument of evil (abrahmacari.), speaking a lie (musavadi...), and living on liquor and drink (suramerayamajjapamadatthayi..), The Digha Nikaya88 mentions the catuyamasmvara of Nigantha Nataputta. These are the references to the Pancanuvratas of Jainas which will be dealt with in the next chapter.

The Buddha at another place in the Amguttara Nikaya89 says to Visakha that the Niganthas took a vow not to go beyond the East, West, North or the South. This vow saves them from violence at least in the prescribed limitation. This vow saves them from violence at least in the prescribed limitation. The Prosadhopavasa also is said to be a way to destroy the karmas.⁹⁰

Some other ways to make a purified soyl also are recorded in Pali literature. One becomes completely naked with no desire or attachment towards anything in the last stage of ascetism. In this acelakatva he should follow a lot of rules and regulations which have been mentioned in the Pali Canon as weel as in the jaina Agama. These will be discussed in the chapter on Ethics.

Moksa Tattva

The well-known reference of the Majjhima Nikaya to the severe panance of Jainas indicates the state of moksa according to Jaina philosophy. The Buddha says that...by severe penance all the sufferings will be destroyed (sabbamdukkhamnijjimmam bhavissati). The means the freedom from all karmic matter is moksa or Salvation according th Jainism.⁹¹ Kundakunda says: that if the causal condition of karmas disappears through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of karmas get blocked. When the springs of karmas thus get blocked the dravay karmas get repulsed. When the dravay karmas completely disappeat. the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of lite:

Hedumbhave niyama jayadi nanissa asavanirodho.

Asavabhavena vina jayadi kammassa bu nirodho.

Kammassabhavena va savvanhu savvaloya dassi ya.

Pavade indiyarahidam avvavaham suhamanantam ⁹²

Nature of Universe

The common topics, which ate said to have been debated by th Samanas Brahmanas and Pariabajakas, are referred to in Pali literature. The Jaina conception of the nature of Universe also appears to be recorded in the Brahmhjala sutta. The four different propsitions maintained by contemporary teachers in this connection are as follows ⁹³: 

(I) This world is finite and circumscribed (antava ayam liko pariyanto)

(ii) It is infinite and without limit (anantava ca ayam loko apariyanto)

(iii) It is both finite and infinite (antava ca ayam loko apariyanto)

(iv) It is neiter finite nor infinite (nveayam loko antava na panananto)

The third theory appears to be the view of Nigantha Nataputta. Buddhaghosa does not clarify this view. He suggests on!y that the limited or unlimited character of the world depends on the limited or unlimited view taken by the eontemplator in his mently perception ro vision,⁹⁴. Perhaps he missed here the philosophical aspect of the proposition. If we apply the standpoint of non-absolutism, its inner meaning can be easily grasped. However, we can point out that from the stand-ppoint of wubstance (dravua) and place (^ksetra), the world is limited and from the standpoint of kala and bhava it is wnlimited.

Records of theories held at the time have been repeated severla times in pali literature. But they do not add anything substantial to what has been mentioned ferore. The later Buddhist provides us with more data in this respect. It indicates a development of the concept under discussion.

Santaraksita refers to a view of Acarya Suri, a Jaina philosopher, in the course of refuting the doctrine of the "thing by itself" (svabhavavada), which thrown light on the Jaina conception of the nature of the Universe. But to understand that reference it would be best to know first the contezt on which it is based. It provides a common grund to the Buddhist and Jaina Logicians, as they are not in favour of Svabhavavada. According to this doctrine, as shown in the Tattasangraha and other books, things originate neither from themselves nor from any other things. They ate not dependent on causes. To prove this theory the holder of this view queries, "Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filament? By whom have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created. Such arguments can be raised about other things too. For instance, the sharpness and other properties of a thorn of any other thing must be regarded as nunaused, since they are around us due to the influence of nature.⁹⁵

Against this view, Santaraksita argues that if you do not postulate any cause, your view cannot be accepted, as nothing can be proved without adequate evidence. He then supports his arguments with those of Acarya Suri. He says that Acary Sure, a Jaina philosopher, also upholds the same objection in the theory of "thing by itself", as he says, "One who declares that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion, it he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were also to adduce reasons what could be gained by mere assertion? ⁹⁶

Here the wiew of Suri refereed to by Santaraksita appeats to be in coformity with Jainism. The theoty of Svabhavao vada is accurate as far as the opposition to the theoty that a God controls the universe is concerned, but if it carries the meaning of ahetukavada, it cannot be admitted by the Jaina philosophy. According to this theory, the world possesses innumerable effects by nature, but its development requires some other material also. For instance, the alay can produce the jar, but it also depends on the apparatus, as stick, wheel, potter, etc. Lotus comes out of mud, which is a cauwe of its fragrance and beauty. Therefore, the view that only nature (svabhava) is responsible for the origination of thins, is inadmissible to the Jainism. The Sutrakrtanga also criticises the view of Svabhavavada: 

Kah kantakanam prkaroti taiksnyam,

Vicitrabhavam mrgapaksinan ca.

Svabhavatah satvamidam pravrttam,

Na kamacarosti kutah prayatnah 97 

Another reference to the jaina concption of the nature of the Universe is recorded by Santaraksita in his examination of the externa world. Kamalasila, the well-known cmmentator of Santaraksita, explains the view saying that the universe accordingly is non-perception of external world. They describe its nature as resembling of things (pratibimbimbadisannisbham). In support of this assertion they say that the entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (subjective or immaterial, objective or meterial, and immaginary ot fictitios) is mere "ideation". This ideation through the diversity of the "chain of causation" is endless and impure, for they havenot realised the truth; but is is pure for those whose karmas have been got rid of. Kamalasila further delineates the nature of the universe according to Buddhism saying that the universe is in perpetual flux and affects all living things. This idea of the entire universe is based on two points-(1) there can be no apprehender of the external world, being non-existent, and (2) every cognition is devoid of both "apprehender" and "apprehended", because it is cognition.

The main ground for establishimg this principle is that the perception of a thing depends on one's mentality. The diversity of imaginations is responsible for the diversity of realities. For instance, asstated by Acarya Aryadeva in his philosophical work Catuhsataka, "the corpse of a woman is considered in varius forms, The sage considers it as the cause of wandering into the world, a libidinous man thinks about her beauty to fulfil his sexual desires, a cock, on the other hand. perceives it for the purpose of eating. Therefore, the world is nothing but only the fiction of imagioation. If it is not so, reality should be perceived or thought in one form by the whole wniverse without any sort of sankeka or samskara,

In this context Santaraksita refers to the view of sumati and then fefutes it from the Buddhist point of view. Acarya Sumati ⁹⁸ argues accordimgly that Particular. Consequently the universe is a combination of atoms which exist in two forms,viz the common and wucommon. Of these the common form is apprehended by the senses and the form of the atoms which is uncommon is held to be held to be amenable to mystic perception." That means the compendium of atoms, the so called Skandha is the univeerse, which we perceive, and the atoms, which are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by us are perceived by the ommiscient.

Thus the external world in the view of Jainism is not imagination, but a multitude of atoms. It cannot be ignored, as perception fo an entity which represents the external world is based on knowlege of feeling. since an entity has different names it can be fictitious but its existence cannot be ignored. The entity is paramartha sat like knowledge or vujnanas. Knowledge can be dependent on the entity, but the entity cannot be dependent on knowledge. The ordinary man, but it does not mean that they ate not tn existence. ⁹⁹.

Santaraksita does not agtee with these views. He remarks that they are the confounded assumpti0ons of some dull witted persons (durmatayat) He argues that the two different forms of a thing must be differdnt from each other. It cannot, therefore, be right to say that a single thing has two forms. The second and the nost towching argument is raised to the effect that as the particular form of an entity is not entirely defferent from the universatl form, there would be a possibility of the fromer being apprehended by the senses; and in that case there could not be the cleat cut distinction that "The common form is anenable to sense cognition and the wneommon form is amenable to mystic cognition."¹⁰⁰

The above objections are met by the jaina philosophers. They say that from the point of view of dravayarthikanaya, reality is the same but from the paryayarthikanaya standpoint its modes are differednt from each other. On the basis of the conception of non-absolutism, there is no room for selfconteadiction.¹⁰¹

The Nature of word

Santaraksita in the Tattvasangraha refers to a view of the Mimamsakas regarding the nature of the word with the idea of establishing his own theory. The mimamsakas hold the view that the word is eternal. Hence there is no author of the Vede. Therefore it is authoritative, reliable, and of divine origin (apauruseya). In this way, they set forth the several views that have been held by various philosophers regarding the exact nature of werd Among them the Jainas are said to have hele the view that the word is atomic in character (audgalo Digambaraih) ¹⁰² Inthe following karika two types of words are mentioned, vez Universal (Samanya) and particular (visesa) which ate the main features of the Jaina conception of reality.

While the establishing of his own viewm Santaraksita criticised the mimamsakas' conception, but he ded not refute the Jaina conception separately. He proved the falsity of the common types of words while criticising the view of the Mimamskas. He set up a theory that the Veda is not an authoritative and reliable source. Hence word is universal in chatacter and non-eternal in form.

As regards the divine origing of the Veda (apauruseyavada) both Jainism and Buddhism are travellers of noe and the same path. The arguments against the Mimamskas' view are based on their own fundamental principles, and therefore, they differ in some places.

The Buddhists say that words are not representative of their meanings, because they are used even for denoting the past and future realities. If they were having an inseparable connection, their usage would be restricted and no meaning would come out of them. They, therefore, think that the word signifies only the inaginary universalised reality ¹⁰³

In the other hand, the jainas postulate a theory that words are of two kinds, universal and particular. If words were not valid to show the existence of the external world, the6y would be meaningless and therefore useless and knowledge would be impossible.¹⁰⁴ Kundakunda says that there are four different kinds of material objects, viz,Skandhas, skandhadesas skandhapradesas, and paramanas, Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. The next two are the differences in molecular constitution. The last one is a primary atom which constitus the other three classes. ¹⁰⁵ The atom cannot be divided (paramanu ceva avibhage).¹⁰⁶ Sound is generated by skandhas when they strike against one another.The sound produces by skandhas may be natural (svabhavika) or artificial (prayogika.)¹⁰⁷ Thunder of cloud and the roar of the sea are natural sound while the artiflcial sond is purposeful which is divided into two types, bhasatmaka (language) and abhasatmaka (non-language). The languate sound again may be aksaratmaka (articulate) and anaksaratmaka (inarticulate). The aksaratmaka sound is made up of alphabetical sounds while the anaksaratmaka is the language of animals. Anaksaratmaka sounes are of four kinds, viz. (i) tata sound produced by musical instruments covered by leather, (ii) vitata sound produced by vina etc, (iii) ghana produced by metallic instruments like tala, etc, and (iv) sausire produced by wind-instruments. ¹⁰⁸ These sounds can be heard and recognized as they are paudagalika.

(3,4,6) Dharma, Adharma, and Kala Dravyas

There are no references to dharma, adharma, and Kala Dravayas in Pali literature. The Darmastikaya is almost similar to the paticcasamuppada (dependent origination) of the Buddhists, but the adharmatikaya is quite unknown to them the kala dravya is recognized in Budhism in the form of prajnaptimatra in the Atthasalim. ¹⁰⁹

(5) Akasa Dravya

A reference is made to the jaina conception of akasa in the Tattvasangraha by the Mimamsaks. Santaraksita raised a question against the Mimamsakas' view regarding the eternality ot works like ghata (jar). They say that if the auditory organ is akasa, several objections could be brought against this theory. For instance, being all-Pervasive there would be equality of contact with all sounds and all organs. How then could the answer be provided on the basis of the auditory organ? The Mimamsakas try to reply that akasa cannot be regarded as being without parts, and therfore it is the auditory organ. They support their view of the Jainas and the Sankhyas both of whom have accordingly the idea of the auditory organ consisting of parts (jainairarhataih Sankhyaissca miravavayavasya vyomah nisiddhatvat110).

Santaraksita and Kamalasila refute this view. They urge that if the divisible akasa is held to be eternal, then all the objections that have been urged against the view "the indivisible akasa is eternal" would become applicable.¹¹¹ The defects pointed out by Santaraksita in this theory are as follows. If akasa is eternal and consists of parts, words should remain in the form "this is the same. Another argument, in support of thid idea, is presented by him in the form that what is eternal does not stand in need to the help of anything. Hence, the cognitions that would proceed from the etetnal source, should all appear simultaneoulsy. Therefore, he concludes that akasa is neither eternal nor consists of parts.¹¹² In the Abhidharma-kosa akasa (1.5) is enumerated in the asamskrta dharmas and described as "without covering" (tatrakasamanavrttih).¹¹³ According to Buddhaghosa, akasa is inflnite.¹¹⁴

The Jainas are of veiew that akasa is eternal and consists of parts (savayava) and having infinite parts or pradesas it provides to Jiva and ajiva. The etymology of akasa itself indicates that it allows space to other substance to enter into or penetrate itself.¹¹⁵ This entering or peneteration is expressed by the word avagaha.¹¹⁶ Different places occupy different locations of akasa. Its mani foldness connotes, as in the case of matter itself, its possession of parts.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

This brief account of the Jaina phiosophy as found in Buddhist literature shows us that:--

(i) the six dravyas and seven Tattvas of Jainism were known to early Pali literature and further refuted in Sanskrit Buddhist philosophical literature.

(ii) Among the sixty two contemporary Philosophies depicted in the Brahmajalasutta and some other places in the Pali Canon. The Jaina view is described as both Ucchedavada and sassatavada.

(iii) According to the Jaina philosophy, the soul is formless and consists of consciousness.

(iv) Mundane soul attracts karmas and then both stand towards each other in arelationship of phenomenal conjunction. This relation is beginningless and continues till one attains salvation.

(v) Kayadanda is more heinous that Manodanda, if a wrong deed is committed intentionally. That means intention is the main source of evil or virtuous acts. Soul will have to enjoy the fruits of karmas done. All is, therefore, a result of previous karmas.

(vi) The destruction of karms depends on triyoga and severe penance with right understanding.

(vii) Universe is not a creation of any god, but it is a combination of atoms.

(viii) Word is atomic in charcater, and

(ix) Akasa (space) is eternal and consists of parts.

These data also indicate that, inspite of minor errors, the knowledge of Jaina Philosophy which Buddhist scholars possessed was of a very high order.