Jain Friends Home Books Index Articles Index
Paroksa Pramana (Indirect
(avisada) knowledge is paroksa,
and it unlike pratyaksa,
dependent on others. It is of five kinds, namely, smarana,
pratyabhijnana, tarka, anumana and agama.
Out of these pramanas in Jaina logic, only the anumaua pramana has been
discussed in Buddhist philosophical literature. Yet it is helpful to get
a brief picture of other pramanas also, since the Jaina and the Buddhist
philosophers vary in their attitudes to other pramanas in Jaina logic,
only the anumaua pramana has been discussed in Buddhist philosophical
literature. Yet it is helpful to get a brief picture of other pramanas
also, since the Jaina and the buddhist philosophers vary in their
attitudes to other pramanas on account of the different stand-points
they had adopted.
is the remembrance of a thing perceived or known before and it is a
source of knowledge of a particular thing in association with earlier
experiences. Therefore, it is regarded on Pramana
by Jaina logicians. But the Vedic philosophers are not ready to accept
it as an indeplendent pramana on the ground that it depends on the
validity of earlier experience (grahitagrahitva).148
The Buddhists joined hands with the Vedic philosophers like Kumarila.149
and rejected the validity of smrtt.150 Their main argument, like that of
the Mimansakas or the Vaisesikas, is that the validity of smrti is
conditioned by previous experience and it is wholly dependent on
experience.151 As a matter of fact, the question of memory being treated
as a pramana does not arise in a system like Buddhism where all
jnanamatra) is considered no pramana.152
the other hand the Jaina logicians unanimously accept the validity of
smrti pramana. Their main argument is that the Sam skaras
recall for any particular purpose the things experienced in the past.
The memory of such things is a source of knowledge gainend through
senses. Therefore smrti is
declared to be a Pramana,
since it is true of facts samvadin
just as perception. The validity of pramana cannot be ascertained merely
by relation to its depedence or independence of experience. If this
argument is accepted even pramaua
will cease to be a pramana,
for inference also depends on knowledge already acquired through direct
examining smrti pramana, we
may also discuss Dharavahika
pramana (continuous cognition). The Dharavahikajnana is accepted as
a pramana by the Nyaya-Viaisesikas154 and the Mimamsakas.155 In Buddhist
tradition only Aracata accepts it.156 He says that only the Yogin's dharavahika
Jnana is pramana, because it involves awareness of Suksmakalakala
(minute divisions of time), while ordinary man's continuous cognition is
not a pramana, because it does not involve such awareness.
Jain logicians have two traditions regarding dharavahika
Pramana. According to the Digambara tradition,157 it is valid
provided it produces a visista pramana (a knowledge of special objects),
while the Svetambara
tradition accepts the dharavahika
jnana as a pramana without any conditions.158
(recognition) is the result of perception and recollection. Its nature
is of tadevedam (that is
definitely this), tatsadrasam
(it is similar), tadvilaksanam
(it is somewhat dissimilar), and tatpratiyogi
(it is different from that), which are avisamvadin
(non-discrepant) and therefore are pramanas themselves.159
as well as Jayanta161 includes pratyabhijnana in pratyaksa. But the
Buddhists do not accept it as a separate pramana. In support of their
theory, they advocate the idea that pratyabhijnana
is nothing, but only a combination or recollection or remembrance and
perception. Further they urge that a thing is momentary (ksanika)
if it dismisses the permanence of entities that are corelated with pratyabhijnana.162
Jainas, on the other hand, uphold the view that because the pratyabhijnana
presupposes an entity in its antecedent and subsequent model condition,
it should be recognised as a separate pramana, like smrti.163
or inductive reasoning is an essential feature to have the concomitance
of an entity164 which is the instrument of inference. Partyaksa, smarana
and pratyabhijnana are associative reasons to originate tarka. It
decides the inseparabel connection (avinabhava
sambandha) among the objects known through inference and agama.
Akalanka is the first to fix the definition and subject of tarka in
do not accept Tarka as a separate pramana. The word Uha
used by them165 in the sense of reasoning is synonymous with the Iha
of of matijnan of Jainas.166 The Buddhist, also deny its validity on the
ground that tarka can only help one to know further on object which is
already known through perception.167
recognised tarka as a pramana, since concomitance cannot be known
without tarks.168 If we do not accept the validity of tarka, we will not
be able to accept either, as they both (inference and tarka) depend on
the same basis for their validity as pramanas.169
words of an Apta are called agama. Apta means a person of superior
intellect and character, who is non-discrepant (avisamvadin)
in his respective subjects.170 The Jainas believe that their prophets
were Aptas and therefore they accepted agamas as an independent pramana.
The Jainas did not restrict the definition of Apta
to the field of spiritual experiences and attainments. An Apta may,
according to Jaina logicians, be any authority on the subject even if it
is only a secular subject.
Vaisesikas and the buddists include agama in inference. But as a matter
of fact, it should not be considered as a part of anumana,
since, unlike anumana, it arises without having perceived signs and
their concomitance. It may be noted here that the Jainas as well as the
buddhists rejected the claim of the Vedic philosophers that the Vedas
are apauruseya (not of human
authorship but of devine origin).171
smrti, pratyabhijnana, tarka,
anumana and agama are
accepted as separate pramanas in Jaina philosophy and included into paroksa
pramana. That means, according to Jainas, there are two pramanas,
viz. pratyaksa and paroksa, while the Buddhists assert the reality of
pra-tyaksa and anumana.172
menas a cognition which takes place after some other cognition,
specially perception (anu vyaptir
nirnayasya pascadbhavi manam).173 The Vedic thinkers may have been
the first to attempt a definition of anumana and their definition
influenced both the Jainas and the Buddhists, although there was no
unanimity among them as regard the exact nature of this pramana.
(5th A.D.) a great Buddhist philosopher, is among the earliest to oppose
the Vedic tradition. He offered a new definition which was latter
adopted by his disciples. This Buddhist definition influenced the Jaina
logicians like Siddhasenadivakara (5th A. D.), Akalanka (8th A.D.), and
Vidyananda (9th A. D.)
the Jaina tradition Acarya Akalanka presents a comprehensive definition
of anumana as follows :-
of Sadhya (what is to be
proved) or major term produced by the Sadhana
(the instruments to prove the sadhya) is called Anumana
which follows linga-grahana
(apprehension of the predicate of proposition) and vyapti-smarana
(remembrance of invariable concomitance). He emphasises that because it
is avisamvadin (non-discrepant) in its own subject and removes the
defects arising due to doubt (sam
saya), perversion (viparyaya)
and indecision (anadhyavasaya),
it should be recognised as a pramana.174
(invariable concomitance) is the main feature of anumana. Avinabhava
anyathauupapannatva, vipaksavyavrtti, and niyatasahacarya
are well-known charactetistics, of vyapti. Sahabhavaniyama
(having co-relation) and kramabhava-niyma
(having successive relation) are the main factors of Vyapti.175
Sahabhava-niyama is understood as a character of the probandam (vyapakadharma)
like rupa (form) and rasa (taste) and kramabhava-niyama is understood as
a character of the probandam (vyapakadharma). This definition indicates
that anumana is not restricated only to the tadatmya
(identical nature) and tadutpatti
(fdentical cause of origination) but it can also be applied to those
thing which do not possess of the tadatymya and tadutpatti relation, For
instance, we can make an inference about the taste of something looking
at its form, which has no tadatmya relation. Likewise, the rise of
Saketa can be inferred by looking at the rise of krttika.176
and sudhana are also tow of
the other main features of anumana. A thing which is to be perceived is
called sadhya and a thing which is related positively with Sadhya, is
is of two kinds, viz. Svarthanumana
(inference by one's own self) and Pararthanumana
(inference by others). The former is valid knowledge which arises in
one's own mind from determinate sadhana, while the latter is a result of
readsons standing in relation to invariable concomitance (vyapti) with
organs or Svarthanumana are
said to be three in number, viz. dharma,
sadhya, and sadhana.
Paksa (minor term) and hetu middle term are also prescribed as its
organs. Here, sadhya and sadhana are included in paksa.
The remaining one is dharmi
which is to be proved by pramanas (prasiddha).178
regards the types of Hetu, the Vaisesika
sutra (9.2.1) refers to fives kinds such as karya, karana,
samyogi, samavai and virodhi.
The Buddhists accept only three hetus, viz. svabhava,
karya, and anuplabdhi.
The Jainas, on the basis of definition of avinabhava,
recognise svabhava, vyapaka,
karya, karana, purvacara, uttaracara and Sahacara.
Upalabdhirupa and anupalabdhirupa are also said to be the types of hetu.
the organs of pararthanumana,
there is no unanimity among the philosophers. The Naiyaayikas have laid
down five organs, viz. pratijna
(proposition), hetu (reason) udaharana
(application) and nigamana (conculusion),179
The propositions, according to them, would be as follows :
There is a fire on the mountain (pratijna).
Since there is smoke (hetu),
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire (udaharana).
There is smoke on the mountain (upanaya),
Therefore there is a fire on the mountain (nigamana).
Sankhyas180 and the Mimamskas181 do not accept the last organs, viz. Upanaya
the field of Buddhist Logic, Acarya Dingnaga appears to have accepted
three organs such as, Paksa, Hetu,
and Drstanta,182 while
Dharmakirti includes Paksa in
Nigrahasthana, and divides Hetu
into three types.183 According to him, the three Hetus are, (i) Paksadharmatva
(its presence of the reason in the subjects totally), (ii) Sapaksasatva
(its presence in similar instances, althugh not in their totality) (iii)
absence in dissimilar instances in their totality). These reasons are
also called the Ayogavyavaccheda,
(impossibility of absence), (ii) Anyayogavyavaccheda,
(imposibility of otherness in similars, but not in the totality of the
similars), (iii) Atyantayogavyavaccheda
(impossibility of others completely), i. e. absence of tatality of the
dissimilar instances) : For instance.
whatever is sat, is ksanika (Paksadharmatva).
the pot is sat, therefore it is ksanika (sapaksasatva).
because all entities are sat (vipaksavyavrtattva).
here the Paksa and Nigamana
are denied and Drstanta and Upanaya
are indirectly accepted. Hetu is the main feature according to the
Buddhist view (vidusamvacyo
hetureva hi kevalam).184
the other hand, the Jainas accept only two organs, Pratijna
(proposition) and Hetu
(middle term-reason). They urge in support of this theory that without
accepting the pratijna or paksa
what is the use of the hetu, and for what would it be utilized.185
Hence, they say the Udaharana
is necessary and deny that Upanaya and Nigamana are conclusive
factors.186 For instance :
there is a fire on the mountain (paksa).
since there is smoke (hetu).
above view of the Jainas is recorded in Buddhist literature. Both
Dharmakirti and Santaraksita criticised this theory. Dharmakirti
examines the Jain propositions with the following example :
trees are sentient beings--cetanas taravah (pratijna).
because they sleep (hetu).
then refutes this theory stating that this instance is fallacious, since
sleep which is manifested by closing of the leaves at night is found
only is some trees, not in their totality.187 The smae thing is
explained in the Darmottarapra-dipa
referred to a view of Patrakesari with regard to the conception of types
of hetu. He puts a number of examples to establish his own view showing
that there are only two organs, Pratijna
and hetu. For instnce :
(a) the hare-marked (sasa-lanchana)
is the Moon (paksa or pratijan),
because it is spoken of as the Moon (hetu).
(a) the pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect (paksa).
because its appearance was felt on the touch of the falling insect. (hetu).
(a) the soul, jar and other things are somehow essentially
because they are somehow inpprehensible in any way, like the horns of
the hare (hetu).
the last case, there is no Corroborative Instance of dissrmilarity. The
jar and other things include the entire group of Positive Entities
and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially
non-existent. And the negative entity has been put forth as the
Instance. Apart from the Positive
and the Negative, there is no
third category wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the
Probandun implies the exclusion of the Probans. Therefore, according to
Patrasvamin, there are only two organs of hetu, wherein other organs can
easily be merged. This is the shortest and most well-defined way of
a matter of fact, the Janias are of the view that the number of steps in
a proposition cannot be fixed as it depends entirely on the level of
competence of the heare.191 manikyanandi recognizes pratijna
and hetu as the minimum essential steps, but he concedes that other
steps may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers.192
Hemacandra193 is also of the same view. Vadideva's view, however, is
somewhat different. He accepts, like the Buddists, one step for the
particular type of hearers and two, three, four, and five for other
general hearers.194 But Patrasvamin's view is more important in this
respect as he does not go beyond the two steps of Pratijna
following in the foot-steps of Dharmakirti criticises the theory of
Patrasvamin. He says that being
spoken of as the moon is present also in thihgs wher the Probandum (sapaksa)
is known to be present. It is also smetimes present in the Man (who is
spoken of as the moon) or in Camphor, Silver and such other things which
are also called moon.195
Likewise, in the second instance Santaraksita points out as a defact
that there is no distinction between the probans (the pain of mine has
been caused by the falling insect), since the proban is a part of the
Proposition itself. The same fact is asserted in different words in the
Probans.196 Similarly, he indicates defects in other examples197 put
forward by Patrasvamin and tries to prove the two steps of Pratijna
and Hetu to be inadequate and
criticism is based on the conception that Jainas recognize only hetu.
Dharmakirti includes Paksa in
Nigrahas-thana and then
divides hetu in three categories, viz. Paksadharmatva,
Sapaksasatva, and Vipaksavyavrtti.
These are called Trairupyahetu.
Both, Drastanta and Upanaya
are included in the Hetu of
the Buddhists. But patrasvamin does not accept this view on the ground
that the Trirupa can also be
found in Hetvabhasa
(fallacious middle term). Further he asserts Paksa
and Hetu as steps of hetu.
Since he establishes Anyathanupapatti
as the definition of hetu, how could be include the Paksa
or Pratijna into other organs
as Dharmakirti did ? It was essential to him as well as other Jaina
Acaryas, therefore, to recognise Pratijna as a separate organ of
regards the aspects of the nature of a probans, the Buddhists, like the
Vaisesikas199 and Sankhyas,200 assert that there are three aspects of a
probans, vis. paksasattva
(presence in the subject), sapaksasattva
(presence in a homologues), and Vipaksasattva
(absence from hetrologues). The naiyayikas accept, in addition to the
above three, two more aspects of the nature of probans viz. abadhitavisaytva
(absence of a counter-balancing probans). and asatpratipaksatva.201 both
the Buddhists and the Jainsa criticise the view of the Naiyayikas.202
The Buddhists include the abadhitavisayatva
in paksa and show the
superfluity of asatpratipaksatva.
The three aspects of the Buddhists are also called the Sadhananga,
wherein the asiddha, viruddha
and the anaikantika are all
the other hand, the Jaina tradition admits that only the anyathanupapanntva,
also called avinabhava, or vyapti,
or vipaksavyavrtti, is the
essential characteristic of a probans (hetu).
vyapto pyeti hetutam.
na cettarkena laksyate.203
however, are not so strict upon this view, and allow any number of
aspects in particular places, even though these aspects are actually
details. patrasvamin is the first to establish this view in Jaina
tradition. The earliest mention of his position is found in Tattvasangraha
of Santaraksita, where his view is mentioned and then refuted. The gist
of Patrasvamin's theory is that anyathanupapannatva
in only one feature of hetu since it is the shortest way of making an
inference. It has capacity to absorb and assimilate all other aspects of
conception of Jainas is criticised by the Buddhist logicians,
Dharmottara, a commentator of Dharmakirti, says that according to Anhrikas,
the inference proceeds from one-feature hetu (ekalaksanajamanumanam)204
which is called ekasupya or anyathanupapannatva.
It indicates that anyathanvpapannatva
should not exist apart from the probans.
the distinguished commentator of Dharmakirti, has also refuted this viw.
He quotes a well-known karika205 of Patrakesarin which, though not
extant, is mentioned in the works of other writers. He is first
mentioned in the Tattaasangraha
and the Pramanavartika
Svavrttitika by the name of Patrasvamin. Acarya Anantavirya says
that this karika belongs traditionally to Patrakesari who wrote a
philosophical treatise named Trilaksanakadarthanam.206
The Sravanavelagola inscription
also supports this view of Anantavirya,207
and his commentator explain the view of Patrasvamin with regard to the
various aspects of proban. They say that according to patrasvamin, the
probans is valid only when it is found to be otherwise impossible and
not when it has the three features (anyathanupapannatva
eva sobhano hetuna punastrilaksanah). This view is elaborated as
follows: Patrasvamin justifies that anyathanupapannatva
is the principal characteristic of a probans. Through presumption (arthapatya)
the same characteristic implies three features, viz. Paksadharmatva,
Sapaksasattva, and Vipaksavyavrattatva,
but the Vipaksavyavrtti or anyathanupapatti
can imply all other features which do not serve any useful purpose. As a
matter of fact, the relation of invariable con-comitance (avinabhava),
which is, the heart of hetu, is not present in the three-featured
reasons (trairupya-hetu), but
found in the one-featured (ekarupya
then quotes a renowned karika of Patrasvamin from the Trilaksanakadarthana
as follows :--
yasya tasyaiva hetuta.
dvavapi stam va ma va tau hi na karanam
yatra tatra trayena kim.
yatra tatra trayena kim.
means anyathanupapannatva is
the only probans. There may be three corroborative intstances, but
really they cannot be depended upon. If the anyathauupapannatva
is not there, what is the use of three features ? and if the anyathanupapannatva
is there, what is the use of the three features (trairupya)
? He illustrates this point saying that the man who has three sons is
called ekaputraka on account
of having one good son (Suputratvat).
Similarly in the case of the three featured probans only feature would
be useful in making inferences.
has tried to prove that there can be no anya-thanupapannatva
hetu in the three-featured probans. For instance, "one must be dark
(paksasatva), because one is
the son of so and so (sapaksasatva),
whose other sons are found to be dark (vipaksasatvavyavrtt)".
This example contains the three-featured probans. Even then it cannot
lead to any valid and definite knowledge and conclusion. For there is no
(relation of invaribale con-comi-tance) between his son and his
darkness. The climate and eating of vegetables by his mother during the
pregnancy is real cause. Therefore, the Trairupya
is not a corrrect theory.
syamastasya putratvaddrasta syama yathetare.
trilaksano heturna niscityai dravartate.209
again pointed out that the one-featured probans has the requisite
capacity of leading to valid knowledge. It has no external corroborative
instances, either of similarity or of dissimimilarity, either in the
form af statement or in the form of actual things, because all things
have been included under the subject or paksa
(minor term) Positive and
Negative entities (bhavabhavatmakaera
sarvapadarthasya paksikrtattvat), and there is nothing apart from
these. As regards the character of "being present in the Minor
term", this is the anyathanupapannatva
hetu and noting apart from the latter. Hence the probans here is one-featured.210
the Buddhist philosophers do not accept this view and they try to
criticise it. For instance, Santraksita questions whether Patrasvamin's
definition of hetu refers to the general position or to a particular
subject on which knowledge is sought or to a particular instance. If the
first alternative is accepted, then, what would be indicated, would be
the existence of the probans in the object where the probandum is
present; and it would not accomplish what is sought to be
Patrasvamin's definition of the Probans is the Anyathanupapanntva
hetu is found in the Minor term (dharmi)
only, the same means of cognition, which has made the Probans known,
would make know Probandum (sadhya),
also. Both these depend on each other. If the Probandum does not become
known, the Probans also cannot become known. Thus the probans would be
useless, and the Probandum would be known by other means. There would be
the incongruity of "mutual interdependence" (anyonyasrayadosa),
if the definite cognition of the Probandum followed from the Probans.
Hence, the cognition ot one would be dependent upon the cognition of the
the third alternative, Santarasita says that if the probans were known
as exisent in the corroborative Instance, that would not bring about the
cognition of the probandum in the Minor term, since its invarible
concomitance will not have been definitely cognised all over.213 He then
refutes the instances214 put forward by Patrasvamin in the course of his
instance, in regard to the first instance concerning Syamaputra, he says
that "One is dark, because he is the son of so and so" is not
the natural reason (svabhavahetu),
as "being product" (krtakatvam)
has a character of non-eternality. The Syamatva,
in his opinion, is the aggregate of five ingredients (pancopadanaskandha).
Nor is the probans based on the effect (karyahetu),
as there is no causal relation between his son and darkness. Nor is it
of the nature of the non-perception (anupalabdhi)
is the probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than
Santaraksita criticises the theory of Patrasvamin on the gounds of other
inferences and concludes that the one-featured probans iis really an
importent theory (klibastenaikalaksanah).
He then tries to prove that three-featured probans has no such defects.
refutation of the theory of one-featured probans is based on the asiddha,
viruddha and anaikantiak
However, the Jaina philosophers like Prabhacandra and Anantavirya say
that these defects are really not on the side of the one-featured hetu
of Jainas, but on the side of the three-featured hetu of they Buddhists,
because it can be applied to even Hetvabhasas. They finally conclude
that the one-featured hetu is the shortest and the simplest route to
make an inference regarding anything.216
as a matter of fact, the three-featured probans are more convenient for
the middle-term (hetu). For, even without knowing the words homologue
and hetrologue everybody can
easily understand the major and the middle term.
regard to the importance of this reference we are in a position to say
that the earliest mention of Jaina conception of anythanupapannatva
as an aspect of a probans has been made by Acarya Dharmakirti.
Afterwards, Santaraksita referred to it and proceeded to examine it
critically. There he mentioned Patrasvamin as the holder of this view.
For the skae of Jaina philosophical history, this reference to
Patrasvamin and his view is very important.
is an application of more than one pramana to one object (prameya).217
jainas are appropritely called Pragmanasamplavavadin218
in the Hetubindu Tika This is
because the theory of relativity of knowledge (anekantavada)
is the basis of Jaina philosophy. It means that an entity is not in
perpetual flux, but it is relatively eternal and having universal and
particular characters (samanyavisesatmaka).
thing consists of infinite attributes which cannot be apprehended by one
by merely superficial knowledge. Other Pramanas, therefore, have clear
scope to know the un apprehended elements of a particular thing. In the
definition of pramana Acary Aklanka added a word anadhigatarthagrahi
which itself indicates that pramanasam
plava can be accepted provided there is upayoga-visesa
to determine the definite or indefinite part of an entity.219 The
Naiyayikas have on such term in their definitions of pramana. But they
accept the pramanasamplava in
on the other hand, Buddhist philosophy does not recognise the validity
of pramanasamplava. According
to its theory, an object is in perpetual flux : it cannot last for more
than a moment. One object cannot have two validities, simultaneously. On
this ground the Buddhist logicians criticise the Jaina and other
systems. These criticisms will be analysed in the next chapter where,
Anekantavada of Jainism will be discussed.
this brief survey of the epistemological and logical concepts of Jainas
as recorded in the Buddhist philosophical literature; we have seen that
Among the ancient thinkers, the Jainas were classified as a group of
philosophers who attained higher knowledge on the basis of personal
Knowledge and vision were two characters of self. of these, vision (darasna)
was originally considered to be the revealer of self (atmaprakasaka).
This idea was developed in logical form and darsana, like Jnana,
was considered to be valid knowledge.
Knowledge (jnana) was
classified as Canonical or Agamic, and Philosophical or Darsanic. The
five kinds of knowledge, namely, mati,
sruti, avadhi, manahparyaya, and kevalajnana
were based on the foremer, while Pratyaksa
and Paroksa are devolopments
of the latter Pratyksa was divided into samvyavaharika
and paramarthika, while paroksa
into smrti, tarka, pratyabhijna,
anumana, and agama.
Unlike Buddhism, paramarthika
pratyaksa was savikalpaka
(determinate). Summati's theory was referred to in the Tattvasangraha
in his connection.
Pure self could attain omniscience. Hence Jaina Tirthankaras achieved
this stage of complete purification and became omniscient.
The idealogy of omniscience was gradually developed in Buddhism as a
result of jaina influence.
Pratijna and hetu were the
only organs of Pararthanumana.
patrakesari's view was referred to by Santaraksita in the Tattvasangraha
in this connection,
was also mentioned there that anyathanvpapatti
was the essential characteristic of Hetu, and
(vii) Apart fromthe knowledge of each other's epistemological theories, the Jainas and the Buddhists, through centuries mutual ciriticism, contributed substantially towards teh enrichment of philosophical speculation in India and added to the sum total of human experience in its quest for the Truth.
Jain Friends Home Books Index Articles Index